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THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GENEROSITY
Raj Bhala*
Reminds me of my safari in Africa.
Somebody forgot the corkscrew and for several days
we had to live on nothing but food and water.
—W.C. Fields
I. GENEROSITY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
A camel never sees its own hump.
—African Proverb
A. Generosity Matters
What does it mean to be “generous”?  The Oxford American
Dictionary provides the following definition and a list of syno-
nyms:
1.  giving or given freely.  2.  magnanimous; noble-minded;
unprejudiced.  3.a.  ample; abundant; copious . . . .  b.  . . .
rich and full. . . .
1.  bountiful, charitable, lavish, openhanded, free, liberal, un-
stinting, ungrudging, munificent, handsome, . . . bounteous.
2.  . . . benevolent, charitable, beneficent, . . . bighearted, un-
selfish, forgiving, humanitarian, philanthropic, humane,
kindly, noble, noble-minded, good; disinterested, . . . unbi-
ased, liberal-minded, broad-minded, tolerant, liberal.  3.a.
. . . plentiful, . . . lavish, overflowing, bountiful . . . ; large,
substantial, sizable, . . . considerable, biggish, big.1
Query whether American trade law toward Sub-Saharan Africa
(“SSA”), manifest in the African Growth and Opportunity Act
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(“AGOA”),2 is “generous.”  Do the technical details of AGOA
comport with the standard lexicographic meaning of “gener-
ous”—a meaning that is entirely consistent with the common
sense understanding of the word?  Or, do these details reveal an
uncharitable, begrudging approach?
There is an easy answer to these questions.  International
trade law is not about generosity.  It is about the practical imple-
mentation of economic policy that tends unevenly toward free—
or freer—trade.  The questions do not matter.  They presume a
paradigm that does not exist.  Maybe it should not exist.  Is it
constructed from a rhetorically alluring but conceptually dubi-
ous amalgam of left-leaning development economic theory and
religiously-based social justice theory?
This easy answer, however, lacks imagination and deceives
itself about reality.  Why see the world of trade law as it is?  Why
not envision a paradigm in which the tendency to liberalize
trade complements a primary orientation to help poor coun-
tries?  For the poor in such countries, and indeed for the poor in
rich countries, trade law ought to be about more than the imper-
fect exercise of Adam Smith’s principle of absolute advantage
and David Ricardo’s principle of comparative advantage (“im-
perfect” because of the many exceptions in the law to trade liber-
alization).  The paradigm ought to include a comprehensible set
of rules that go beyond protecting the self-interest of domestic
producers in developed countries (the “imperfections”), and fo-
cus on promoting independence in a liberal trade regime
among would-be producers and exporters in poor countries.  Af-
ter all, the latter group remains in dire need.  (There is little
doubt the U.S. Congress is well aware of this need in the African
context, because AGOA contains “Sense of the Congress” provi-
sions with “Findings” about the need to provide SSA with debt
relief, funds for HIV/AIDS treatment, and help against desertifi-
cation.)3  In this altered paradigm, when pressed, opting to pre-
2. 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 3701-3741 (2005).
3. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3731 (on debt relief, finding in section 3731(a) that the bur-
den of external debt is a major impediment to growth); § 3739 (on HIV/AIDS, finding
in section 3739(a) that 21 million people in Sub-Saharan Africa (“SSA”) are infected,
eighty-three percent of the estimated 11.7 million deaths worldwide have been in SSA,
and the disease inflicts serious damage on African economies); § 3741 (on desertifica-
tion, finding in section 3741(a) that it affects one-sixth of the world’s population and
one-quarter of the total land area, and imposes an annual cost of US$42 billion).  The
“Sense of the Congress” portions of these provisions, in sections 3731(b), 3739(b), and
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fer the relatively poorer over outright free trade is a kind of ac-
ceptable legal triage, consistent with deeply-rooted principles of
social justice.
Generosity, then—in international trade law—does matter,
at least if a better world for the poor is imagined and if their
world view is acknowledged.  With good reason, many individual
Americans—from the Great Plains of Kansas to the five bor-
oughs of New York City—regard themselves as generous people.
They give as private citizens, and through their favorite non-gov-
ernmental organizations (“NGOs”), especially their churches,
mosques, synagogues, and other houses of worship.  Yet, from
overseas, America is not perceived as a generous nation—at least
not anymore.  The generation of American officials who created
and implemented the Marshall Plan has died or retired, and so
too has the generation of foreigners who remember it, or other
American legislative beneficence.  Today, leading intellectuals
from Turkey to New Zealand see only the hand, visible or invisi-
ble, of national self-interest in American laws that affect them.
Is that hand in American trade law, specifically in the one
dimension of trade law designed to help poor countries—prefer-
ential trading arrangements (“PTAs”)?  The answer is “yes.”  Evi-
dence to support this answer includes the PTA America built for
3741(b), along with a section on private sector assistance to combat HIV/AIDS (section
3738), contain advice from Congress to the President as to policy initiatives that should
be undertaken.  Other African Growth and Opportunity Act (“AGOA”) provisions indi-
cate the awareness on Capitol Hill of challenges and needs in SSA.  For example, Con-
gress conveys its sense through AGOA that:
• The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) should initiate eq-
uity funds to support infrastructure projects in SSA, particularly to expand
opportunities for women entrepreneurs,
• The Export–Import Bank should expand its financial commitments, specifi-
cally its loan, guarantee, and insurance programs, in SSA, and
• The U.S. Agency for International Development (“USAID”) should con-
tinue to support programs that promote the long-term economic develop-
ment of SSA, specifically with respect to primary and vocational education,
health care, democratization and good governance, food security, a stable
environment for private sector-led growth, decentralization and local partic-
ipation, enhanced technical and managerial capacity, and environmental
protection.
See 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 3733, 3734, 3737.  Also pursuant to AGOA, Congress directs the Sec-
retary of Agriculture to consult with Land Grant Colleges and Universities on ways to
improve the flow of American farming techniques to SSA (e.g., insect and sanitation
procedures, soil conservation, equipment use and maintenance, crop yield maximiza-
tion, and crop marketing), and calls for the donation to eligible SSA countries of air
traffic control equipment that no longer is in use. See 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 3740, 3736.
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SSA, namely, AGOA.  Yet, AGOA bespeaks the limits of Ameri-
can generosity.  This PTA is rife with conditions an SSA country
must fulfill to receive its benefits—duty-free, quota-free treat-
ment for originating exports—and these conditions are troub-
ling on economic, political, and religious grounds.4  Stated dif-
ferently, the protectionist devil embedded in the details of
AGOA means the hand America extends to SSA is not fully
open.
If the United States cannot give selflessly to SSA, a region
averaging an annual per capita income of roughly US$500, is
there any instance in its trade law in which it can?5  After all, to
state the obvious (but not to succumb to politically correct termi-
nology), much of economic life in SSA is backward, and progress
requires self-giving help that eventually will allow it to help itself.
Of the roughly forty-nine least-developed countries, most of
them are in SSA.6  By many indicators, whether conventional
4. AGOA also contains provisions nakedly designed to advance American market
access in SSA.  For example, Congress mandates the expansion of the Foreign Commer-
cial Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce (“DOC”) in SSA, so as to help Ameri-
can businesses identify export opportunities in SSA. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3735(a)-(b).  Con-
gress also directs the International Trade Administration (“ITA”) of the DOC to target
the tariff and non-tariff barriers that are preventing sales of American goods and ser-
vices in SSA, and to negotiate with SSA authorities for enhanced market access for
American companies. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3735(c).  Further, Congress declares that a com-
prehensive trade and development policy toward SSA is an important goal. See 19
U.S.C.S. § 3732(a).  It directs the President to provide technical assistance to SSA on
matters such as the fostering of private sector relationships between the United States
and SSA, the liberalization of trade, promotion of exports, membership and participa-
tion in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), compliance with WTO standards, ad-
dressing agricultural trade policy concerns (e.g., market liberalization, export develop-
ment, and agribusiness investment), and increasing trade in services. See 19 U.S.C.S.
§ 3732(b).  Notably, this list is one-sided.  It does not include the often-articulated con-
cerns about American trade law and policy from the perspective of SSA, such as reduc-
ing tariff peaks, eliminating tariff escalation, or slashing agricultural export subsidies.
5. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3701(6) (stating the per capita income statistic as a congres-
sional finding).
6. With a population of about 140 million, the largest least-developed country is in
South Asia—Bangladesh.  For an excellent account of modern African history, particu-
larly colonialism in the early 20th century (1914-1930), colonialism under strain (1930-
1945), nationalist movements and decolonization (1950s-1970s), and development
challenges (1980s and 1990s), see MARTIN MEREDITH, THE FATE OF AFRICA (2005), and
BASIL DAVIDSON, MODERN AFRICA:  A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY (3d ed. 1994).  For
an extensively researched tour de force on the race to colonize among five European
Powers (Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Italy) and the “four Cs” (Commerce, Chris-
tianity, Civilization, and Conquest), see THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA:
THE WHITE MAN’S CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 (1991).  For
a text on the modern political history of Africa, depicting the complexity and diversity
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measures of economic growth or broader measures of human
development, the performance of SSA is dreadful, and the plight
of the majority of people in SSA is monstrous.7  Negotiating
trade deals such as the accessions to the World Trade Organiza-
tion (“WTO”) for China and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia nec-
essarily raise concerns about economic, political, and national
security interests for the United States.8  Perhaps in such bar-
gains it is easier to appreciate why the normal paradigm of what
international trade law is about dominates.  However, most
(though not all) SSA countries (“SSACs”) do not manifest the
same obvious, direct, and large strategic importance (though,
even on this point reasonable minds can differ).9  For these
countries, it would seem an altered paradigm in which generos-
ity matters seems not only compelling but also, from a self-inter-
ested view, inexpensive.
Why not, then, re-conceptualize AGOA as unconditional
generosity from the richest country to the poorest of countries?10
If the answer is the United States cannot or will not (or both)
take this legislative step, then is there any space at all for gener-
osity in American trade policy?  To be sure, hardheaded Ameri-
can trade negotiators may be tired, understandably so, of whin-
ing from or about poverty-stricken Third World nations.11  Cor-
of the African continent, see NAOMI CHAZAN, PETER LEWIS, ROBERT A. MORTIMER, DON-
ALD ROTHCHILD & STEPHEN JOHN STEDMAN, POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AF-
RICA (3d ed. 1999).
7. On the modern political economy of Africa, including the relationship of Africa
to world markets and the incursion of foreign powers and imposition of post-colonial
systems, see GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS (1998).
8. On these two accessions, see, for example, Raj Bhala, Saudi Arabia, the WTO, and
American Trade Law and Policy, 38 INT’L LAW. 741 (2004), and Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon:
An Essay on China’s WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469 (2000).  On Viet-
nam, see, for example, the work of Professor David Gantz, University of Arizona College
of Law, posted at the website of the United States-Vietnam Trade Council, http://dev.
usvtc.org/trade/wto/Gantz/Gantz.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
9. See, e.g., A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of International Law in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury:  An African Perspective, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1706, 1711 (1995).
10. Interestingly, at least one voice calls for re-conceptualization of political organ-
ization in SSA.  Stephen Ellis, a researcher at the African Studies Center in Leiden, the
Netherlands, argues for radical intervention through an international trusteeship for
SSACs that are abject failures, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Somalia.  As he puts it,
“[s]ick states there cannot be restored with the medicines and surgical techniques of a
bygone era.  What is required instead are international joint ventures . . . .” Stephen
Ellis, How to Rebuild Africa, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 135, 148.
11. At the same time, there are many stereotypes about developing and least-devel-
oped countries, including many in Africa.  For a candid discussion of myths and
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rectly, they—along with prominent economists—point out the
benefits from a PTA are akin to an asset the value of which is
diminishing.12  As America’s most-favored nation (“MFN”) tariff
rates decline through successive rounds of multilateral trade ne-
gotiations, the margin of preference created by PTAs erodes to
single-digit levels.  The cost of compliance with preferential rules
of origin further erodes this margin.  As Oxfam International ob-
serves:
Complexity is a heavy burden on producers, who have to
make decisions about which imports to use in the face of
often quite different rules for different markets.  Administra-
tive costs are another problem.  Exporters have to provide
documentation on the location of a good’s production, the
number of machines used, the workers employed, and the
production process used; manufacturers have to submit to
on-site visits and inspections to verify the documentation.
Even in relatively well-off countries, the administrative costs
can be high:  approximately 3 per cent of the total value of
the product.  In poorer countries, they are likely to be much
higher.  It is a paradox that rules which are supposed to en-
courage the economic development of the poorest countries
may actually deter investment through their complexity.  Sim-
pler rules of origin would require less documentary proof and
therefore place less of a burden upon LDC [least- developed
country] exporters, helping these countries to realize greater
benefits from trade preferences.13
In the face of such difficulties, it is logically asked, why not focus
less on preferences and more on internal reform, including rule
of law, anti-corruption drives, and conflict management?  Why
not stay with the conventional paradigm, and re-emphasize the
preconceptions about Africa—cannibalism, ferocious animals, impenetrable jungles,
oddly-clad tribesman, safaris, and the like—see CURTIS A. KEIM, MISTAKING AFRICA:  CU-
RIOSITIES AND INVENTIONS OF THE AMERICAN MIND (1999).
12. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, The Poor’s Best Hope—Trading for Development, ECONO-
MIST, June 22, 2002, at 24.  Economic critiques sometimes discount, or ignore entirely,
the benefits associated with dispute resolution under regional trade agreements
(“RTAs”), perhaps because of the difficulty of quantification.  For a comparative analy-
sis of adjudication under African RTAs and the multilateral system, see Maurice Oduor,
Resolving Trade Disputes in Africa:  Choosing Between Multilateralism and Regionalism:  The
Case of COMESA and the WTO, 13 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 177 (2005).
13. Oxfam Int’l, Stitched Up:  How Rich-Country Protectionism in Textiles and Clothing
Trade Prevents Poverty Alleviation 22-23 (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 60, Apr. 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.oxfam.org/en/files/bp60_textiles.pdf.
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unilateral dismantling of trade barriers, as classical and neo-
classical economic theory prescribes?14
Fair enough, but might there be a reason to this advice, a
mixture of intellectualism and common sense, with some heart-
felt sagaciousness?  To a poor man with next to nothing, one
dollar doubles his earnings and is consequential even in an infla-
tionary environment.  As is widely reported, 1.1 billion people
live on less than US$1 per day, and about 2.8 billion people live
on less than US$2 per day.15  Cases of economic needs more
pressing than those manifest in SSA do not exist on such a large
scale in any other part of the world.  If there is a critique to be
made about generosity, or the lack thereof, by the First to the
Third World, then surely its greatest force is in the context of
SSA.
True, plenty of blame can be put on governments, and on
individual leaders.  Many scholars—including African intellectu-
14. For a collection of essays on Africa as a peripheral region, and the problems of
post-Cold War conflict in Africa, see AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS:  POST-COLD WAR CHAL-
LENGES (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 2d ed. 1995). See also Andrew Balls
& Chris Giles, Leadership Key in Poor Nations, Says Wolfowitz, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept.
26, 2005, at 2 (quoting the first Presidential Address of World Bank President Paul
Wolfowitz:  “Sustainable development depends as much on leadership and accountabil-
ity, on civil society and women, on the private sector and on the rule of law, as much as
it does on labor or capital.”).  A significant economic initiative is the “New Partnership
for Africa’s Development” (“NEPAD”), supported by the Group of Seven (“G-7”), the
United Nations General Assembly, and African leaders. See generally IAN TAYLOR,
NEPAD:  TOWARD AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT OR ANOTHER FALSE START? (2005); Victor
Mosoti, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development:  Institutional and Legal Challenges of
Investment Promotion, 5 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 145 (2004).  NEPAD originated on October
23, 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria, after many discussions about a new vision for development,
an African renaissance, the importance of a partnership with mutual obligations, the
need for a peer review mechanism to assess performance of a country by other coun-
tries (which NEPAD creates—the “African Peer Review Mechanism” (“APRM”),
whereby governments voluntarily submit to scrutiny of their economic management
and political standards), and the potential benefits of globalization.  The NEPAD Secre-
tariat is located in Johannesburg, South Africa, and depends heavily on the support of
the South African government for facilities and staff.  There is a debate as to whether
the 53-nation African Union (“AU”) ought to take over NEPAD, which would entail
moving the Secretariat to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where the AU is headquartered.  The
AU has established a peace and security council, and a pan-African parliament.  How-
ever, the principal argument against such a takeover and move is that NEPAD would
become bogged down in AU bureaucracy. See David White, Leaders Split over Plan for AU
to Take Over NEPAD, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 28, 2005, at 4.
15. The World Bank defines the international poverty line at US$1.08 per day,
using 1993 dollars in purchasing power parity terms.  As of 2001, 1.1 billion people
were below this line, and on average they fell short by US$113. See Aspirations and Obliga-
tions, ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2005, at 67.
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als—candidly expose the self-inflicted wounds that so depress
outside observers.16  However, disastrous policies and ghastly be-
havior are not the point.  It also is true there is more to develop-
ment in SSA than the growth of particular sectors, even ones as
important as textiles17 and apparel18 (“T&A”).  Input supply
problems, decrepit infrastructure, remoteness from markets,
and a general perception that SSA is not a business-friendly envi-
ronment contribute to or exacerbate the woes of the region.19
Indeed, as the World Bank observes in its 2005 Doing Busi-
ness publication (an annual report), poor African countries im-
pose more regulatory obstacles to establishing and operating
businesses and generating jobs, and have achieved less reform,
than countries in any other part of the world.20  Ranking coun-
tries based on the time, cost, and minimum capital requirement
to start a business, the difficulty of hiring and firing workers, the
16. For a powerful attack on African dictators, which discusses the economic and
political ruination they have wrought, and an argument that it is naı¨ve to blame exter-
nal factors for the misery of Africa when, in truth, one-party states led by “presidents for
life,” who are tyrannical kleptocrats far worse than the colonialists they replaced, are to
blame for black neo-colonialism, see GEORGE B.N. AYITTEY, AFRICA BETRAYED (1992).
For an argument that internal political and economic mismanagement and adverse
global developments threaten the survival of African countries, and a discussion that
the encounter between African and Western concepts of sovereignty has been awkward,
ambiguous, unsatisfactory, and tragic, see CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, AFRICA AND THE IN-
TERNATIONAL SYSTEM:  THE POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL (1996). See also Kimberly
Medlock Wigger, Comment, Ethiopia:  A Dichotomy of Despair and Hope, 5 TUL. J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 389 (1998) (calling upon Ethiopia to eliminate objectionable trade practices so
it can reap the full benefits of AGOA).  An excellent example of a trade-related self-
inflicted wound comes from Nigeria.  Mosquito bed nets impregnated with insecticide
cost less than US$4, and reduce the risk of infants dying from diseases like malaria by
fourteen percent (down to sixty-three percent—still unacceptably high).  Yet, from time
to time, Nigeria has imposed a tariff of up to forty percent on imported nets, to protect
its domestic net making industry.  Moreover, the cost of distributing nets exceeds the
cost of production. See The $25 Billion Question, ECONOMIST, July 2, 2005, at 24, 26.
17. Technically, a “textile” is any material made from a fiber or other extended
linear material, such as thread or yarn.  There are multiple classes of textiles, including
woven, knitted, knotted (e.g., macrame´), or tufted cloth, and also non-woven fabrics,
such as felt. See 7 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 647 (15th ed. 1994); see also 21 id. at
570.
18. In contrast, “apparel” refers to clothes, i.e., dress or garments. See OXFORD
AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND THESAURUS, supra note 1, at 62. R
19. See Stephen E. Lamar, The Apparel Industry and African Economic Development, 30
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 601, 601 (1999); see also DAVID K. LEONARD & SCOTT STRAUSS,
AFRICA’S STALLED DEVELOPMENT:  INTERNATIONAL CAUSES AND CURES (2003) (analyzing
civil conflict and other factors inimical to development).
20. See Andrew Balls, African Nations Fare Poorly in Business Rankings, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 13, 2005, at 9.
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tax regime, the complexity and cost of getting licenses and regis-
tering property, access to credit, investor protection, and imped-
iments to cross-border trade, Sub-Saharan African countries
dominate the bottom rungs.21  Sudan, Chad, the Central African
Republic, Burkina Faso, and Congo hold the last five spots.22  In
the top five spots are New Zealand, Singapore, the United States,
Canada, and Norway.23  Not surprisingly, to avoid the red tape,
more than forty percent of the economy of SSA is informal,
which is the highest percentage in the world.24  But, again, these
ignominious facts are not the point.
To anticipate the analysis later, grounded in part on Catho-
lic social justice teaching, the Good Samaritan neither put condi-
tions on help, nor scrutinized the unfortunate man as to his pre-
dicament.25  He also eschewed lecturing the man on the practi-
cal limits of his assistance.  Rather, the Good Samaritan helped
with an open hand.
B. Generosity and Trade with Africa
Notwithstanding various American foreign aid programs,
the first serious trade legislation enacted by the Congress to pro-
mote trade with SSA was section 134 of the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act (“URAA”), the implementing legislation for the
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade accords, which Congress
approved on December 8, 1994.26  That section obligated the
President to establish a comprehensive trade and development
21. See id. at 9.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Different Skills Required, ECONOMIST, July 2, 2005, at 61.
25. The confines of an article do not permit an exposition of this teaching.  Put
succinctly, while different scholars number the postulates of social justice differently,
there are three that most, if not all, authors would count as fundamental:  The protec-
tion of human dignity, the pursuit of the common good, and the exercise of a preferen-
tial option for the poor.  For one explanation of the teaching and application to special
and differential treatment in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),
see RAJ BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE pts. VIII–IX (2003).  For a
compilation of the social justice teachings of the Catholic Church, see PONTIFICAL
COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE & PEACE, COMPENDIUM OF THE SOCIAL DOCTRINE OF THE CHURCH
(2005).  For a discussion of the dignity of the human person and the preferential op-
tion for the poor, see KEVIN E. MCKENNA, A CONCISE GUIDE TO CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACH-
ING pts. I, III-IV (2002).
26. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 134, 108 Stat. 4809,
4840 (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) (approved Dec. 8, 1994).  Section 134
is at 19 U.S.C.S. § 3554 (2005).
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 10 24-FEB-06 13:27
308 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:299
policy for Africa.  For the next five and one-half years, the re-
sponse was a quintessentially inside-the-Beltway one.
Starting in February of 1996, the President produced an-
nual reports—there were five in total, the last one under section
134 of the URAA coming in January of 2000.27  Essentially, the
reports called for study committees, articulated policy
frameworks and objectives—including the continued pre-emi-
nence of American leadership in multilateral economic organi-
zations—spoke of a partnership with Africa, extolled the efforts
by American government agencies to promote sustainable eco-
nomic development in SSA and the integration of the region
into the multilateral trading system, and signaled support for
legislative proposals.28  In Congress, bills were introduced to
confer upon SSA assorted trade benefits, all of which would have
been conditional on the type of exported merchandise and
country from which it was exported.29
27. See Letter from President Clinton to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of
the Senate Committees on Finance and Foreign Relations and the House Committees
on Ways and Means and International Relations (Jan. 21, 2000), available at http://
usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/unmonth/a0012102.htm.
28. AGOA also calls for annual comprehensive reports (beginning no later than
May 18, 2001, and continuing through 2008) by the President to Congress on American
trade and investment policy toward SSA, and implementation of related legislation. See
African Growth and Opportunity Act § 106, 19 U.S.C.S. § 3705 (2005); see also OFFICE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON U.S. TRADE AND IN-
VESTMENT POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN
GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT (2005) (the fifth of eight annual reports).
29. The bills started on September 26, 1996, with H.R. 4198 in the 104th Congress,
on which no action was taken.  This bill called for benefits only to SSA countries pursu-
ing market economic reforms.  It also envisioned a discussion forum that might lead to
a free trade area (“FTA”) with some SSACs, and the elimination of textile and apparel
(“T&A”) quotas on products from Kenya and Mauritius (the only SSA countries at the
time on which the United States had imposed quotas).  H.R. 4198 was reintroduced on
April 24, 1997 in the 105th Congress as H.R. 1432.  The reintroduced version contained
new language about extending existing benefits from the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (“GSP”) program to SSACs that met strict eligibility criteria.  On March 11, 1998,
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 1432.  But the analog in the Senate, Title I of
S. 2400, called the “Africa Growth and Opportunity Act,” introduced on July 21, 1998,
differed from the House version by requiring that T&A imports from SSA be made
from fabric of American origin.  The Senate did not consider S. 2400 in the 105th
Congress, thus no further action occurred.  On February 2, 1999, H.R. 1432 was reintro-
duced as H.R. 434 to the 106th Congress.  The House passed it on July 16, 1999.  In the
Senate, S. 1387 was introduced on July 16, 1999, and the text of Title I of this bill
resembled that of S. 2400.  On November 3, 1999, the Senate passed an amended ver-
sion of H.R. 434, calling it the “Trade and Development Act of 2000,” with Title I called
the “African Growth and Opportunity Act,” and thereby replaced the text of S. 1387.
On May 4, 2000, the Conference Report on H.R. 434 was filed (as House of Representa-
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In other words, notwithstanding political rhetoric to the
contrary, promoting trade with SSA never was viewed as an ur-
gent matter calling for unprecedented generosity in a singularly
desperate situation.  It never was a radical initiative based, for
example, on religiously-based social justice principles elevated
near the level of economic logic or political expediency.  Rather,
a trade program ostensibly tailored for SSA always was conceived
of in the familiar legal constructs of PTAs, most notably the GSP,
and the protection these schemes afford American producers of
like or directly competitive products, especially in the T&A sec-
tor.30  Not surprisingly, the program that finally emerged said,
and continues to say, a good deal about the limits of American
generosity.
On May 18, 2000, finally the establishment in Washington,
D.C. acted.  Congress passed the Trade and Development Act of
2000.31  Signed by President Bill Clinton on this date, the legisla-
tion took effect on October 1, 2000.32  Specifically, Title I is the
African Growth and Opportunity Act, or AGOA, which is codi-
fied at title 19, sections 3701 to 3741 of the United States Code,
with the provisions on trade policy and SSA benefits in sections
3701 to 3724.33  The function of AGOA is to provide preferential
tives Report 106–606) and passed by the House, with the African Growth and Opportu-
nity Act as Title I of the Report.  The Senate passed the same Report on May 11, 2000.
See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 108TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND COMPILATION
OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES 45-46 (Comm. Print 2003) [hereinafter U.S. TRADE STATUTES
COMPILATION]; H.R. REP. NO. 106-606 (2000) (Conf. Rep.).  The most recent edition of
this publication, known informally as the “Blue Book,” was not released until late Octo-
ber 2005. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 109TH CONG., OVERVIEW AND
COMPILATION OF U.S. TRADE STATUTES pt. I (Comm. Print 2005).  The discussion of
AGOA, at pages 44-58, is substantially the same, with an update for AGOA III (ex-
plained below) in the 2005 edition.  Regarding Kenya and Mauritius, AGOA contains a
special provision for them requiring the President to eliminate all remaining quotas on
T&A items within 30 days of these countries adopting an effective visa system to prevent
illegal transshipment of these articles, or the use of counterfeit documents relating to
them. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(c).
30. See Sungjoon Cho, The WTO’s Gemeinschaft, 56 ALA. L. REV. 483, 509-11 (2004).
31. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED STATES 91 (2002), availa-
ble at http://www.customs.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/publications/trade/iius.ctt/
iius.doc.
32. See Trade and Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251
(approved May 18, 2000); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 91. R
33. The full text of AGOA is available at the official AGOA website, http://www.
agoa.gov (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).  Also available on this website are the customs
regulations for AGOA (at section 10.211-.217 of the customs regulations), the rules
governing the implementation of the GSP provisions applicable to AGOA, and the Afri-
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trade treatment for certain products originating in eligible
SSACs for a limited period.34  The key words (as explained be-
low) are “certain,” “originating,” “eligible,” and “limited.”  The
legislation authorizes the President to grant unilateral preferen-
tial trade benefits to an SSAC, but only if it pursues economic
and political reform, and satisfies other criteria, only with re-
spect to its exports that satisfy an array of technical require-
ments, and only up through a sunset date.35
Technically, the original AGOA legislation is AGOA I.
Under the Administration of President George W. Bush,
through the Trade Act of 2002, amendments to AGOA I were
made, known as AGOA II, particularly concerning the require-
ments for duty-free treatment of apparel articles.36  The Presi-
dent signed AGOA II on August 6, 2002, and it entered into
force effective immediately upon enactment (i.e., the signature
date).37  Under the AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004, signed on
July 12, 2004, the Bush Administration made modifications to
the program, including an extension of the overall program
through September 30, 2015.38  This legislation is called AGOA
III, and it entered into force on July 13, 2004.39  Based on AGOA
I, the starting date for trade preferences was October 1, 2000,
and the sunset date was September 30, 2008.  AGOA II did not
change the start or sunset dates:  Rather, it amended some of the
substantive features of the program.40  Hence, new legislation
was needed for AGOA benefits to continue beyond 2008, and
will be needed again for them to continue beyond 2015.41
There is little doubt AGOA enjoys bipartisan support.
Whether it is effective as a “trade, not aid” kind of policy is an-
other matter.  Advocates for AGOA are wont to trot out statistics
showing rising volumes and values of trade with SSA, or at least
can Growth and Opportunity Act Implementation Guide (prepared by the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative (“USTR”)).  Sections 3731-3741, which are not discussed herein, deal with is-
sues related to economic development, and contain Sense of Congress statements, gen-
erally on matters not directly linked to trade.  There are no sections 3725-3730.
34. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 91. R
35. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 45. R
36. See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933; see also U.S. TRADE
STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 45. R
37. See generally Trade Act of 2002.
38. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466b (2005).
39. See id.
40. See generally Trade Act of 2002.
41. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 46. R
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certain sectors in individual SSACs.42  Increased exports from
SSA are particularly noteworthy and welcome.  Indeed, depend-
ing on the time period and merchandise categories selected,
such demonstrations are possible.  For example, as a percentage
of gross domestic product (“GDP”), overall exports from SSACs
rose between 2001 and 2005.43  However, as intimated, AGOA is
not a free trade deal.
Not every poor African country is eligible for the program.
Even if a country is a beneficiary, not every category of merchan-
dise qualifies for the benefits.  Finally, even if a country and mer-
chandise qualify, complicated preferential rules of origin must
be satisfied.  As an economic matter, therefore, the extent to
which SSACs gain from AGOA must be considered.  As a matter
of social justice, it must be asked whether they could gain more
if the rules on country and product eligibility, and on origin,
were relaxed.  In brief, this Article poses the question, is AGOA a
classic instance of ungenerous giving by the rich man to the
poor man?
II. AGOA ELIGIBILITY FOR WHOM?
Do not try to fight a lion
if you are not one yourself.
—African Proverb
A. The Deceptive List
That AGOA is about neither free trade nor unconditional
charity is evident from a cursory glance at the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”).  General Note 3(c)(i)
to the HTSUS explains what is suggested by such a look, namely,
that in the “Special” sub-column of the “Rates of Duty 1” col-
umn, the letter “D” indicates “special tariff treatment may be pro-
vided.”44  Overall, about 1835 products receive the symbol “D” in
42. See Kevin C. Kennedy, The Incoherence of Agricultural, Trade, and Development Pol-
icy for Sub-Saharan Africa:  Sowing the Seeds of False Hope for Sub-Saharan Africa’s Cotton
Farmers?, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 307, 342-43 (2005). But see J.M. Migai Akech, The
African Growth and Opportunity Act:  Implications for Kenya’s Trade and Development, 33
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 651, 671 (2001).
43. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, REGIONAL ECONOMIC OUTLOOK:  SUB-SAHARAN AF-
RICA 37 (Supp. 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/afr/reo/
2005/eng/02/pdf/ssareo.pdf.
44. HARMONIZED TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES GN-7, general note
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the HTSUS and, therefore, are eligible for duty-free treatment
under AGOA.45  The list is also published in the Federal Register
and maintained on an official website.46  Not every country in
SSA, however, actually qualifies for AGOA benefits.
Section 107 of AGOA, as well as General Note 16 of the HT-
SUS, list the countries in SSA potentially eligible for AGOA ben-
efits.47  There are forty-eight such countries, defined as “sub-
Saharan African country” (i.e., SSAC).  Table 1 lists them below,
along with six key economic and demographic indicators:48
1. Population.49
2. Per capita GDP, in U.S. dollars and purchasing power par-
ity (“PPP”) terms.50
3. Percentage of population below poverty line.51
4. Distribution of family income, as measured by a Gini In-
dex.52
3(c)(i) (2005) (emphasis added) [HTSUS]; see also SCOTT WARREN TAYLOR, BASIC PRIN-
CIPLES OF TARIFF CLASSIFICATION 37 (2005); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 94. R
45. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 94.  Whether an SSAC actually makes R
and exports a particular product is a separate but critical matter.
46. See id.  The official website is http://www.agoa.gov (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
47. This section is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3706 (2000).
48. All data in Table 1 are from the CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK (2005) [hereinafter CIA WORLD FACTBOOK], available at http://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/.  The data are current as of August 30, 2005, or the most
recent available year (for some countries or variables, data are from previous years).
Average totals for each variable are calculated by the author.  For additional data
sources on SSACs, see, for example, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2005
AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT COMPETITIVENESS REPORT (2005) (giving coun-
try-specific import and export data).
49. Population estimates for many SSACs reflect the effects of HIV/AIDS.  These
countries are Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Re-
public, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Ke-
nya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See CIA
WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ R
factbook/fields/2119.html (entry for “Population”).
50. The concept of purchasing power parity (“PPP”) is discussed in standard eco-
nomic development texts, and in RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:  THEORY AND
PRACTICE (3d ed. forthcoming 2007-2008) (manuscript ch. 41, on file with author). See
CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ R
factbook/fields/2004.html (entry for “GDP—per capita”).
51. There is no standard definition of the poverty line used in every country
(though the US$1 or $2 figure is widely quoted).  Different countries define that line
differently, with richer countries generally using a higher figure than poor countries.
See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publica- R
tions/factbook/fields/2046.html (entry for “Population below poverty line”).
52. The concept of a Gini coefficient is discussed in standard economic develop-
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5. Composition of GDP by sectors, namely, agricultural, in-
dustrial, and services.53
6. Labor force by occupation, i.e., percentage of labor force
in each sector.54
“NA” indicates the data in question are “Not Available.”)  Table
1 reveals considerable diversity among SSACs on the variables.
However, it also reveals depressingly familiar patterns.
Those patterns are low per capita GDP, a high incidence of
poverty, skewed income distribution, economies that are sub-
stantially agrarian with little industry or services, and predomi-
nantly rural populations.  Average and total figures for the
SSACs, as well as contrasts with the United States, are at the bot-
tom of Table 1.  The stark disparities speak for themselves.  It is
worth highlighting the American average per capita GDP is sev-
enteen times that of the SSAC average, and whereas half the
population in SSACs is below the poverty line, the U.S. figure is
twelve percent.55
ment texts, and in BHALA, supra note 50 (manuscript ch. 41).  Briefly, this coefficient R
measures the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a particular
country.  Mathematically, it is calculated by plotting (in a box) cumulative family in-
come on the vertical axis, against the number of families (arranged from richest to
poorest) on the horizontal axis.  The result is called a Lorenz curve.  The coefficient is
the ratio of (1) the area between the Lorenz curve for a country and a forty-five-degree
line to (2) the area of the entire triangle beneath the forty-five-degree line.  The 45-
degree line represents absolute equality, where all families have the same income.  A
Gini coefficient of zero would mean the Lorenz Curve overlaps fully with this line, and
the country is perfectly equal in terms of income distribution.  If the coefficient is one,
then all income is distributed to one family, and the Lorenz Curve is the same as the
horizontal axis and right vertical side of the box. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note
48, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2172.html (entry R
for “Distribution of family income—Gini index”).  Normally, a Gini coefficient is re-
ported as between zero and one.  The CIA apparently scales up by a factor of 100, thus
yielding results from 0 to 100.
53. These figures show the contribution of agriculture, industry, and services to
total GDP.  If data are incomplete, the figures sum to less than 100%. See CIA WORLD
FACTBOOK, supra note 48, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ R
fields/2012.html (entry for “GDP—composition by sector”).
54. This variable shows the percentage of the labor force employed in each sector.
If the data are incomplete, the figures sum to less than 100%. See id. at http://www.cia.
gov/cia/publications/factbook/fields/2048.html (entry for “Labor force—by occupa-
tion”).
55. By no means are these statistics the only relevant ones.  The United Nations
Development Program publishes a Human Development Index (“HDI”), which takes
into account education and life expectancy, as well as per capita income.  In 2003, Nor-
way topped the HDI, and the United States ranked 10th in the world.  At the bottom
was Niger (number 177).  South Africa, though it ranked number 52 in terms of per
capita GDP, was at number 120 on the HDI, and had fallen 35 places since 1990, prima-
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TABLE 1:  Statistical Profile of Sub-Saharan Africa56
Per Capita Population Gini Index
GDP (U.S. Below (0 to 100, GDP Labor Force
dollars, Poverty Line 100 most Composition by Composition by
Country Population PPP) (percent) unequal) Sector (percent) Sector (percent)
Angola 11,190,786 2100 70 NA Agriculture: 8 Agriculture: 85
Industry: 67 Industry and
Services: 25 Services
combined: 15
Benin 7,460,025 1200 33 NA Agriculture: 36.3 Agriculture: NA
Industry: 14.3 Industry: NA
Services: 49.4 Services: NA
Botswana 1,640,115 9200 47 NA Agriculture: 4 Agriculture: NA
Industry: 44 Industry: NA
Services: 52 Services: NA
Burkina Faso 13,925,313 1200 45 48.2 Agriculture: 39.5 Agriculture: 90
Industry: 19.3 Industry: NA
Services: 41.3 Services: NA
Burundi 6,370,609 600 68 42.5 Agriculture: 48.1 Agriculture: 93.6
Industry: 19 Industry: 2.3
Services: 32.9 Services: 4.1
Cameroon 16,380,005 1900 48 47.7 Agriculture: 43.7 Agriculture: 70
Industry: 20.1 Industry: 13
Services: 36.2 Other: 17
Cape Verde 418,224 1400 30 NA Agriculture: 12.1 Agriculture: NA
Industry: 21.9 Industry: NA
Services: 66 Services: NA
Central 3,799,897 1100 NA 61.3 Agriculture: 55 Agriculture: NA
African Industry: 20 Industry: NA
Republic Services: 25 Services: NA
Chad 9,826,419 1600 80 NA Agriculture: 22.6 Agriculture:
Industry: 35.6 greater than 80
Services: 41.7 Industry: NA
Services: NA
Comoros 671,247 700 60 NA Agriculture: 40 Agriculture: 80
Industry: 4 Industry: NA
Services: 56 Services: NA
Congo- 3,039,126 800 NA NA Agriculture: 7.4 Agriculture: NA
Brazzaville Industry: 52 Industry: NA
(Republic of Services: 40.6 Services: NA
Congo)
Coˆte d’Ivoire 17,248,040 1500 37 36.7 Agriculture: 27.8 Agriculture: 68
Industry: 19.4 Industry: NA
Services: 52.8 Services: NA
Democratic 60,085,804 700 NA NA Agriculture: 55 Agriculture: NA
Republic of Industry: 11 Industry: NA
Congo Services: 34 Services: NA
(Zaire until
May 1997)
Djibouti 476,703 1300 50 NA Agriculture: 3.5 Agriculture: NA
Industry: 15.8 Industry: NA
Services: 80.7 Services: NA
rily because of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. See Emerging-Market Indicators, ECONOMIST, Sept.
17, 2005, at 106.
56. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48. R
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Per Capita Population Gini Index
GDP (U.S. Below (0 to 100, GDP Labor Force
dollars, Poverty Line 100 most Composition by Composition by
Country Population PPP) (percent) unequal) Sector (percent) Sector (percent)
Equatorial 535,881 2700 NA NA Agriculture: 3 Agriculture: NA
Guinea Industry: 95.7 Industry: NA
Services: 1.3 Services: NA
Eritrea 4,561,599 900 50 NA Agriculture: 12.4 Agriculture: 80
Industry: 25.9 Industry and
Services: 61.7 Services
combined: 20
Ethiopia 73,053,286 800 50 40 Agriculture: 47 Agriculture: 80
Industry: 12.4 Industry: 8
Services: 40.6 Services: 12
Gabon 1,389,201 5900 NA NA Agriculture: 7.4 Agriculture: 60
Industry: 46.7 Industry: 15
Services: 45.9 Services: 25
Gambia 1,593,256 1800 NA NA Agriculture: 26.8 Agriculture: 75
Industry: 14.5 Industry: 19
Services: 58.7 Government: 6
Ghana 21,029,853 2300 31.4 40.7 Agriculture: 34.3 Agriculture: 60
Industry: 24.2 Industry: 15
Services: 41.4 Services: 25
Guinea 9,467,866 2100 40 40.3 Agriculture: 25 Agriculture: 80
Industry: 38.2 Industry and
Services: 36.8 Services
combined: 20
Guinea-Bissau 1,416,027 700 NA NA Agriculture: 62 Agriculture: 82
Industry: 12 Industry: NA
Services: 26 Services: NA
Kenya 33,829,590 1100 50 44.9 Agriculture: 19.3 Agriculture: 75
Industry: 18.5 Industry: NA
Services: 62.4 Services: NA
Lesotho 1,867,035 3200 49 56 Agriculture: 15.2 Agriculture: 86
Industry: 43.9 Industry: NA
Services: 40.9 Services: NA
Liberia 3,482,211 900 80 NA Agriculture: 76.9 Agriculture: 70
Industry: 5.4 Industry: 8
Services: 17.7 Services: 22
Madagascar 18,040,341 800 50 38.1 Agriculture: 29.3 Agriculture: NA
Industry: 16.7 Industry: NA
Services: 54 Services: NA
Malawi 12,158,924 600 55 NA Agriculture: 54.8 Agriculture: 90
Industry: 19.2 Industry: NA
Services: 26 Services: NA
Mali 12,291,529 900 64 50.5 Agriculture: 45 Agriculture: 80
Industry: 17 Industry: NA
Services: 38 Services: NA
Mauritania 3,086,859 1800 40 37.3 Agriculture: 25 Agriculture: 50
Industry: 29 Industry: 10
Services: 46 Services: 40
Mauritius 1,230,602 12,800 10 37 Agriculture: 7.6 Agriculture: 14
Industry: 30 Industry: 36
Services: 62.4 Services: 50
Mozambique 19,406,703 1200 70 39.6 Agriculture: 21.1 Agriculture: 81
Industry: 32.1 Industry: 6
Services: 46.9 Services: 13
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Per Capita Population Gini Index
GDP (U.S. Below (0 to 100, GDP Labor Force
dollars, Poverty Line 100 most Composition by Composition by
Country Population PPP) (percent) unequal) Sector (percent) Sector (percent)
Namibia 2,030,692 7300 50 70 Agriculture: 11.3 Agriculture: 47
Industry: 30.8 Industry: 20
Services: 57.9 Services: 33
Niger 11,665,937 900 63 50.5 Agriculture: 39 Agriculture: 90
Industry: 17 Industry: 6
Services: 44 Services: 4
Nigeria 128,771,988 1000 60 50.6 Agriculture: 36.3 Agriculture: 70
Industry: 30.5 Industry: 10
Services: 33.3 Services: 20
Rwanda 8,440,820 1300 60 28.9 Agriculture: 41.1 Agriculture: 90
Industry: 21.2 Industry: NA
Services: 37.7 Services: NA
Sa˜o Tome´ and 187,410 1200 54 NA Agriculture: 16.5 Agriculture: NA
Principe Industry: 15.4 Industry: NA
Services: 68.1 Services: NA
Senegal 11,126,832 1700 54 41.3 Agriculture: 15.9 Agriculture: 70
Industry: 21.4 Industry: NA
Services: 62.7 Services: NA
Seychelles 81,188 7800 NA NA Agriculture: 2.8 Agriculture: 10
Industry: 28.7 Industry: 19
Services: 68.9 Services: 71
Sierra Leone 6,017,643 600 68 62.9 Agriculture: 49 Agriculture: NA
Industry: 30 Industry: NA
Services: 21 Services: NA
Somalia 8,591,629 600 NA NA Agriculture: 65 Agriculture: 71
Industry: 10 Industry and
Services: 25 Services
combined: 29
South Africa 44,344,136 11,100 50 59.3 Agriculture: 3.6 Agriculture: 30
Industry: 31.2 Industry: 25
Services: 65.2 Services: 45
Sudan 40,187,486 1900 40 NA Agriculture: 38.7 Agriculture: 80
Industry: 20.3 Industry: 7
Services: 41 Government: 13
Swaziland 1,173,900 5100 40 NA Agriculture: 16.1 Agriculture: NA
Industry: 43.4 Industry: NA
Services: 40.5 Services: NA
Tanzania 36,766,356 700 36 38.2 Agriculture: 43.2 Agriculture: 80
Industry: 17.2 Industry and
Services: 39.6 Services
combined: 20
Togo 5,681,519 1600 32 NA Agriculture: 39.5 Agriculture: 65
Industry: 20.4 Industry: 5
Services: 40.1 Services: 30
Uganda 27,269,482 1500 35 37.4 Agriculture: 35.8 Agriculture: 82
Industry: 20.8 Industry: 5
Services: 43.6 Services: 13
Zambia 11,261,795 900 86 52.6 Agriculture: 14.9 Agriculture: 85
Industry: 28.9 Industry: 6
Services: 56.1 Services: 9
Zimbabwe 12,746,990 1900 70 50.1 Agriculture: 18.1 Agriculture: 66
Industry: 24.3 Industry: 10
Services: 57.7 Services: 24
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Per Capita Population Gini Index
GDP (U.S. Below (0 to 100, GDP Labor Force
dollars, Poverty Line 100 most Composition by Composition by
Country Population PPP) (percent) unequal) Sector (percent) Sector (percent)
SSAC TOTAL 727,318,879 Not Not Not Not applicable Not applicable
applicable applicable applicable
SSAC 15,152,476.65 2,352.08 51.42 46.25 Not applicable Not applicable
AVERAGE (if (average of (average
applicable) thirty-nine of twenty-
countries six coun-
for which tries for
data are which data
available) are availa-
ble)
United States 295,734,134 40,100 12 45 Agriculture: 0.9 Farming, forest-












What countries does the section 107 list exclude?  There are
fifty-three countries in total on the African continent (or, fifty-
four if Western Sahara is counted as an independent entity).57
As the list of SSACs numbers forty-eight, obviously some coun-
tries on the continent are excluded.  “Who?” and “why?” are the
obvious questions.
The answer is all of North Africa.  That is, most of the Arab
part of the African continent is excluded.  The relevant coun-
tries are Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.  The entire
population on the continent is approximately 800 million, and
these North African countries account for 158.6 million.58  Thus,
demographically speaking, the exclusion of North Africa is sig-
nificant—about twenty percent of the continent.
Geographically speaking, it would be more accurate to dub
the legislation not “AGOA,” but “MSSAGOA,” where “MSS”
stands for “Most of Sub-Saharan,” or “GNAGOA,” where “GNA”
57. See CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/ R
publications/factbook/reference_maps/pdf/africa.pdf.
58. For the total population of the African continent, see United Nations Popula-
tion Information Network, http://www.un.org/popin/data.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2005).  For the population in North Africa, see CIA WORLD FACTBOOK, supra note 48 R
(The 158.6 million figure is the sum of the populations of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mo-
rocco, and Tunisia, which is 158,603,970).
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stands for “Generally Non-Arab.”  Why exclude much of Arab Af-
rica, particularly in a post–9/11 era in which the United States
overtly seeks to enhance its national security by encouraging
trade as a vehicle to promote prosperity, peace, and even democ-
racy?  A number of responses may be ventured.  Economically,
much of North Africa fares relatively better than SSA.  Egypt,
Morocco, and Tunisia are examples.  Algeria and Libya are rich
in energy resources such as oil and natural gas.  One North Afri-
can country, Morocco, benefits from a free trade agreement with
the United States, while another, Egypt, ranks near the top of aid
recipients from the United States.
Most significantly, the section 107 list of SSACs itself is de-
ceptive.  To be on it is to be a contender, not a prize-winner.
That is, the listed countries are potential, not necessarily actual,
recipients of AGOA preferences.  Conceptually, there are at least
three more steps for an SSAC to receive benefits.  First, the Presi-
dent must designate them as an “eligible sub-Saharan African
country” (“Eligible SSAC”) by applying eight statutory criteria,
explained below.  Second, the President must designate an Eligi-
ble SSAC as a “beneficiary sub-Saharan African country” (“Bene-
ficiary SSAC”) using the same country-eligibility criteria that
have long-existed in the GSP.  Third, among Beneficiary SSACs,
not all are treated equally.  Further requirements, if satisfied,
render a Beneficiary SSAC a recipient, in fact, of trade prefer-
ences on T&A articles.
For now, the point to appreciate is that AGOA never was
conceived as an unconditional program for all African countries.
No doubt there are political justifications for disallowing some
countries—for example, governance by despicable regimes—
from AGOA preferences.  There is, however, at least one eco-
nomic rationale for leaving open the possibility of AGOA eligi-
bility, namely, that the poor are no less poor in many of the ex-
cluded countries as in the eligible countries.  Moreover, in terms
of social justice theory, it may be urged that underlying any cal-
culation by a donor—such as the United States—to behave judi-
ciously when giving to the poor must be an impulse to give, and
give generously, regardless of fault by leaders under whom the
poor suffered.
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B. The Eight Requirements
The layman might think any SSAC receives AGOA benefits.
Little could be further from the truth.  To summarize the tortu-
ous statutory language of AGOA and the GSP, there are differ-
ences among:
• Being geographically located in SSA, i.e., an SSAC.
• Being located in SSA and also eligible for AGOA benefits,
i.e., an Eligible SSAC.
• Being located in SSA, eligible for AGOA benefits, and des-
ignated a beneficiary for those benefits, i.e., a Beneficiary
SSAC.
• Actually receiving the benefits, or, to put it undiplomati-
cally, a lucky Beneficiary SSAC.
Countries listed in the SSA region are listed in section 107 of
AGOA.59  But, as is clear from an earlier provision, section 104,
not every country in SSA is an “eligible” one.60  To be eligible,
not just potentially eligible, for AGOA preferences, an SSAC
must satisfy requirements set out in section 104(a) of AGOA, or
at least must be making continuous progress toward meeting
them.61  There are eight such requirements.  Yet, meeting all of
them means a country is an Eligible SSAC—eligible for benefits,
but not an actual recipient.
The eight requirements are not to be confused with the sep-
arate requisites in the GSP, which concern designation as a ben-
eficiary developing country (“BDC”) under that program.  In
other words, there is an important distinction between an Eligi-
ble SSAC in the language of section 104(a) of AGOA,62 and a
Beneficiary SSAC in the language of section 111(a) of AGOA.63
In effect, meeting the eight AGOA eligibility requirements in
section 104(a) qualifies an SSAC for AGOA preferences only in a
general sense.  To qualify in a meaningful sense, it is necessary to
satisfy these eight requirements, plus the requirements of the
GSP program, and thereby be designated a Beneficiary SSAC.
59. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3706 (2005).
60. Section 104 is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3703 (2000).
61. Section 104(a) is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 3703(a).
62. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a).
63. To make matters a bit more confusing, section 111(a) of AGOA is an amend-
ment to the GSP statute, not placed with the rest of the AGOA provisions.  Section
111(a) is codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2466a(a) (2000), amended by AGOA Acceleration Act of
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-274, § 7(a)(2), 118 Stat. 823, 823-24.
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 22 24-FEB-06 13:27
320 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:299
This necessity is evident from two legal facts, discernible
only after several perusals of the relevant statutory provisions.
First, benefits for T&A merchandise, which section 112 of AGOA
establishes, are designed for “a beneficiary sub-Saharan African
country described in [section 2466a(c), the GSP statute, as
amended by section 111(a) of AGOA].”64  Second, benefits for
non-T&A merchandise, under the GSP program as amended by
AGOA, are only for “a beneficiary sub-Saharan African coun-
try.”65  Put simply, to get any AGOA benefits on T&A articles, or
GSP benefits on non-T&A merchandise, what matters is being a
Beneficiary SSAC.  To be a Beneficiary SSAC, there are two dis-
tinct sets of requirements, eight new ones created by AGOA, and
the existing GSP requisites.  Satisfying the eight AGOA require-
ments renders a country an Eligible SSAC.  Satisfying these re-
quirements, plus the GSP requisites, renders a country a Benefi-
ciary SSAC.
The GSP requisites have existed for decades, and are de-
scribed and critically analyzed elsewhere.66  Suffice it to say they
embody political, legal, and economic interests of the United
States, and illustrate the argument that GSP preferences are not
about unconditional generosity.  As for the AGOA eligibility re-
quirements, associated with each one of the eight of them are
criteria, which ostensibly help clarify the interpretation and ap-
plication of the requirements.  Yet, the criteria tend to be ambig-
uous.  Consequently, the requirements themselves are eminently
malleable to suit the interests of the United States, and easily
susceptible to American self-interest.  The eight requirements
and attendant criteria for designation as an Eligible SSAC are as
follows:
64. 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(a).  As quoted above, section 3721(a) refers to 19 U.S.C.S.
§ 2466a(c) (2005), a provision of the GSP statute.  Section 2466a(c) defines “benefici-
ary sub-Saharan African country” as a country listed in section 107 of AGOA, 19
U.S.C.S. § 3706, and that the President determines is eligible under “subsection (a) of
this section,” i.e., under section 2466a(a).  In turn, section 2466a(a)(1) incorporates by
reference two sets of eligibility requirements—the eight AGOA requirements (in sec-
tion 2466a(a)(1)(A)), and the GSP requirements (in section 2466a(a)(1)(B)).
65. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(a)(1).  This provision, specifically section 2466a(a)(1)(A)
and (B), makes clear that both sets of criteria must be satisfied to get GSP treatment.
66. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(a)(1)(A) (concerning the eight AGOA eligibility re-
quirements); § 2466a(a)(1)(B) (concerning the GSP beneficiary requirements); see also
U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 17-19; BHALA, supra note 50 (man- R
uscript ch. 45).
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1. Market Economic Reforms67
A market-based economy must exist.  Three criteria for mar-
ket orientation are set out:  (1) protection of private property;
(2) incorporation of an open, rules-based system; (3) minimal
interference by the government in the economy, particularly by
eschewing price controls, subsidies, and ownership of assets.
Overall, it is unclear whether these criteria are exclusive or mini-
mal conditions.
Further, each criterion presents ambiguities.  What deter-
mines whether private property is respected—a high standard
like the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Con-
stitution, or something more akin to the standard on expropria-
tion in Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (“NAFTA”),68 or some other, lesser standard?  In practical
terms, does incorporation of an open, rules-based system mean
WTO membership?  How much government interference is min-
imal, and what happens if there is analogous behavior by the
American government in its economy—for example, the price
regulation of public utilities, direct or indirect subsidies to an
industry, such as aircraft or airlines, or ownership of certain as-
sets?
2. Liberal Political Reforms69
A Western-style liberal political system must exist.  Four cri-
teria are mentioned.  There must be (1) rule of law, (2) political
pluralism, (3) the right to due process, and (4) equal protection
under the law.  Here, there are unclear aspects of the criteria.
How is the rule of law fairly gauged—by an index con-
structed by an international organization, an independent NGO,
a committee of jurists established by the International Bar Asso-
ciation, or some other body?  What makes a political system “plu-
ralist”—are multi-candidate elections sufficient, or must there be
multiple parties, too?  Must there be universal enfranchisement
at a particular age, and is free speech in the style of the First
67. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(A); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 48. R
68. See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
69. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(B); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 48. R
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Amendment to the Constitution necessary?  Does “due process”
refer to both procedural and substantive rights, and by what
yardstick is due process to be measured?  What happens if cer-
tain groups within a country, such as prisoners from a conflict,
are denied due process in a manner allegedly perpetrated by the
United States—for example, prisoners in Guanta´namo Bay?  As
for “equal protection,” is the benchmark here U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the concept?
3. Elimination of Barriers to American Trade70
Barriers to American trade and investment must be elimi-
nated.  There are three criteria, all focused on market access for
American businesses into SSACs:  (1) the provision of national
treatment and measures to create an environment favorable to
investment; (2) the protection of intellectual property (“IP”);
and (3) the resolution of bilateral trade and investment disputes.
The ambiguities in these criteria concern their relationship
to accepted multilateral standards.  Does “national treatment”
mean adherence to Article III, particularly paragraphs 1-2 and 4,
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”)?  Is a
climate conducive to investment if the rules of the WTO Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Investment Measures (“TRIMs”)71 apply,
or are other factors relevant?  Would IP protection through the
WTO Agreement on Trade Related-Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (“TRIPs”)72 suffice, or is proof of enforcement—to
avoid disputes akin to those between the United States and
China—needed too?  As for disputes, must they all be resolved,
and to the satisfaction of the United States?
4. Development Programs73
Broad-based economic policies must be put in place.  There
are six criteria:  (1) the reduction of poverty; (2) improved
70. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(C); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 48. R
71. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instru-
ments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
72. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
73. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(D); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 48. R
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health care; (3) increased educational opportunities; (4) ex-
panded physical infrastructure; (5) the promotion of private en-
terprise; and (6) the formation of capital markets through
micro-credit and other programs.  There is no particularized gui-
dance, however, as to judging whether such policies exist or are
effective.
Poverty itself is a complex concept.74  In traditional develop-
ment economics thinking, it refers to deprivation of income.
This approach is challenged famously by Nobel-Prize winning
economist Amartya Sen, in Development as Freedom.75  Briefly, he
argues poverty is the deprivation of capabilities—in effect, “un-
freedom” caused not only by a lack of income, but also by eco-
nomic, political, transparency, and security deficits.76  From a
Sen-like perspective, then, the six criteria are appropriate.  Yet,
less ambiguity as to how each criterion is measured would be
useful, as a number of questions are left unresolved.
What, other than Gini coefficients, should be used to mea-
sure poverty?  Is improved health care gauged just by life expec-
tancy at birth, or do other statistics, such as disease incidence
rates, and physicians per 1000 people, matter too?  In consider-
ing educational opportunities, are all levels—primary, secon-
dary, tertiary, and adult—equally relevant, and are enrollment
rates for girls to be accorded at least as much significance as for
boys?  While there is no end to physical infrastructure improve-
ment, which facilities matter most—airports, energy, housing,
railways, roads, seaports, telecommunications, or some combina-
tion thereof?  How is the promotion of private enterprise differ-
ent from some of the criteria connected to the first eligibility
requirement, such as private property and minimal government
involvement, and the second eligibility requirement, such as the
rule of law?
5. Combating Corruption77
A system must exist to combat corruption and bribery.  Only
one criterion is offered, and then by way of example—signing
the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Offi-
74. See BHALA, supra note 50 (manuscript chs. 41-42). R
75. AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
76. See id. at 104-27.
77. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(E); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 48. R
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cials in International Business Transactions (“Anti-Bribery Con-
vention”).  This Convention, promulgated by the Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) in
1997, and signed and ratified by thirty-six countries, is a notable
achievement.78
Possibly the most frequently mentioned criticism of post-in-
dependence African leaders has been the propensity of a large
number of them to loot their countries.79  Signing the OECD
Anti–Bribery Convention is an easy first step, but one far short of
dealing with the reality of bad acts by SSA officials.  Would refer-
ence to reports by prominent NGOs, such as Transparency Inter-
national, which periodically ranks countries on corruption crite-
ria, be another useful criterion?  Might it also be worthwhile to
evaluate anti-corruption efforts by monitoring efforts to prose-
cute corruption cases, clean up customs services, and interview
actual and potential victims (for example, exporters and import-
ers)?
6. Protecting Worker Rights80
Internationally recognized worker rights must be protected.
Five criteria define these rights:
(1) the right of association; (2) the right to organize and bargain
collectively; (3) a prohibition on forced or compulsory labor; (4)
a minimum age for the employment of children; and (5) accept-
able working conditions with respect to minimum wages, hours
of work, and occupational safety and health.
As these criteria are drawn from conventions of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (“ILO”), which a large number of
countries have ratified, they enjoy widespread support.  The
principal ILO Conventions on these rights are:
1. ILO Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom of Associ-
ation and Protection of the Right to Organise (“ILO
78. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, adopted Nov. 21, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43 (1998),
37 I.L.M. 1 (1998).  The United States ratified the Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions on December 8, 1998.
See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Convention on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions:  Ratification Status
(Jan. 28, 2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/1898632.pdf.
79. See supra note 16. R
80. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(F); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 48. R
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Convention 87”) (ratified by 144 countries);81
2. ILO Convention No. 98 Concerning the Application of
the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain
Collectively (“ILO Convention 98”) (ratified by 154
countries);82
3. ILO Convention No. 105 Concerning the Abolition of
Forced Labour (“ILO Convention 105”) (ratified by 165
countries, but denounced by two countries);83
4. ILO Convention No. 5 Fixing the Minimum Age for Ad-
mission of Children to Industrial Employment (“ILO
Convention 5”) (ratified by seventy-two countries, yet
denounced by all but ten of them);84
5. ILO Convention No. 7 Fixing the Minimum Age for Ad-
mission of Children to Employment at Sea (“ILO Con-
vention 7”) (ratified by fifty-three countries, yet de-
nounced by all but nine of them);85
6. ILO Convention No. 1 Limiting the Hours of Work in
Industrial Undertakings to Eight in the Day and Forty-
eight in the Week (“ILO Convention 1”) (ratified by
fifty-two countries, denounced by one of them);86
7. ILO Convention No. 30 Concerning the Regulation of
Hours of Work in Commerce and Offices (“ILO Con-
vention 30”) (ratified by thirty countries, denounced by
81. See Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection
of the Right to Organise, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into force June 4, 1950)
[hereinafter ILO Convention No. 87], available at http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/.  The full
text of each ILO convention, plus ratification information, is available at the ILOLEX
Database of International Labor Standards (“ILOLEX”) web site, at http://www.ilo.
org/ilolex/.
82. See Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257 (entered
into force July 18, 1951) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 98].
83. See Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, June 25,
1957, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (entered into force Jan. 17, 1959) [hereinafter ILO Convention
No. 105].
84. See Convention (No. 5) Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of Children to
Industrial Employment, Nov. 28, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 81 (entered into force June 13,
1921) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 5].
85. See Convention (No. 7) Fixing the Minimum Age for Admission of Children to
Employment at Sea, July 9, 1920, 38 U.N.T.S. 109 (entered into force Sept. 27, 1921)
[hereinafter ILO Convention No. 7].
86. See Convention (No. 1) Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings
to Eight in the Day and 48 in the Week, Nov. 28, 1919, 38 U.N.T.S. 17 (entered into
force June 13, 1921) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 1].
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one of them);87 and
8. ILO Convention No. 155 Concerning Occupational
Safety and Health and the Working Environment (“ILO
Convention 155”) (ratified by forty-five countries).88
Yet, these conventions are not without controversy.
For instance, as the list indicates, a number of countries
have denounced various conventions.  Moreover, from this list,
the only convention the United States has ratified is ILO Con-
vention 105 on Forced Labor.89  Finally, each right raises impor-
tant conceptual questions.  For example, what is the right mini-
mum age for children, or is the answer contextual?90  Likewise,
does the “acceptability” of working conditions depend, in part,
on the industry and country at issue, or is there a minimum floor
that ought to be applied universally?
7. American National Security and Foreign Policy91
A country must not engage in activities that undermine the
national security or foreign policy interests of the United States.
No criteria are associated with this requirement.  Hence, it is the
most open-ended of all eight requirements, and a number of
questions are obvious.  What are the interests of the United
States?  What is the distinction between America’s national se-
curity and foreign policy interests (or, in reality, is there a dis-
tinction)?  What would it take to undermine the undefined in-
terests?  Does not undermining these interests mean, in practice,
neutrality, or is support (tacit, at least) required?  What happens
if some activities by an SSAC undermine one American interest,
but its other acts are inconsequential or supportive vis-a`-vis other
interests?
87. See Convention (No. 30) Concerning the Regulation of Hours of Work in Com-
merce and Offices, June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Aug. 29, 1933)
[hereinafter ILO Convention No. 30].
88. See Convention (No. 155) Concerning Occupational Safety and Health and the
Working Environment, adopted June 22, 1981, 1331 U.N.T.S. 279 (entered into force
Aug. 11, 1983) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 155].
89. See supra notes 81-88. R
90. See Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doha, 36 INT’L LAW. 159 (2002) (discussing,
inter alia, the plight of workers in the ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh).
91. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(2) (2005); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 48. R
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8. Human Rights and Terrorism92
A country must not engage in gross violations of interna-
tionally recognized human rights.  It also must cooperate in in-
ternational efforts to eliminate human rights violations.  Like-
wise, a country must not provide support for acts of international
terrorism, and cooperate in international efforts to eliminate ter-
rorist activities.  In effect, there are two requirements in one—
human rights, which is new to the list of requirements, and anti-
terrorism, which is connected to, if not overlapping with, the sev-
enth requirement.
There are no specific criteria for the human rights criterion.
Rather, the criteria are implicit in the modifying words.  “Gross”
and “internationally recognized” indicate reference to accepted
human rights conventions.  Yet, it is not clear what constitutes
“cooperation.”  With respect to the anti-terrorism requirement,
there are no helpful modifying words.  What is “international
terrorism”?  What does it mean to “provide support”?  What does
it mean to “cooperate”?  Finally, as for both requirements, the
word “eliminate” must be read as a venerable aspiration, not as a
distinct requirement itself, because—as both a historical and re-
alistic matter—there is little probability of permanent elimina-
tion of human rights violations.
In AGOA, Congress delegated to the President the authority
to enforce the eight country-eligibility requirements.93  Thus, as
a practical matter, the power to give or take away AGOA prefer-
ences lies inside the White House.  The ambiguities in the crite-
ria associated with each requirement mean this power is consid-
erable.
These criteria are not necessarily “wrong,” nor are answers
unavailable to the questions posed above.  Rather, the questions
highlight the fact—a political fact created by legal ambiguities in
the criteria—that an American president has considerable dis-
cretion to interpret and apply the eligibility requirements to
SSA.  The President can take them seriously, through strict, non-
partisan analysis of the criteria, look at the criteria self-inter-
estedly, by manipulating them to suit economic or political
goals, or do anything in between.
92. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(3); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra
note 29, at 48. R
93. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(a) (2005).
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As a general proposition, there is nothing inherently wrong
in setting requirements with ambiguous criteria and thereby
conferring discretion to the President.94  The point is simply the
AGOA eligibility criteria contain considerable room for opportu-
nistic mischief, and thereby for bounded generosity—as well as
for magnanimity.  This Janus face presents a large question:
Why not drop most, if not all (except, perhaps, the eighth), of
the country-eligibility requirements and attendant criteria?  Justi-
fication for the eighth requirement may be that there is no char-
itable obligation to give to evil-doers, and human rights violators
and terrorists count as such.
To return to the legalities of AGOA, it is section 111(a) that
authorizes the President to designate an SSA country (from the
section 107 list, above) as an eligible one, if that country meets
the section 104(a) eligibility requirements as of the date AGOA
was enacted (May 18, 2000).95  Initially, President George W.
Bush designated thirty-four of the forty-eight potentially eligible
countries as actually eligible.96  He excluded fourteen countries
with a combined population of 183,484,671, and average per
capita GDP of US$1664:  Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi,
Comoros, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Coˆte d’Ivoire,
Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland,
Togo, and Zimbabwe.97
Subsequently, President Bush declared five of these coun-
tries to be Eligible SSACs:  Swaziland (effective January 17,
2001), Coˆte d’Ivoire (effective May 16, 2002), Sierra Leone (as
of October 2, 2000, but with delayed implementation until Octo-
ber 23, 2002), Democratic Republic of Congo (as of December
31, 2002, but with delayed implementation), and Gambia (also
94. But see Kevin C. Kennedy, Presidential Authority Under Section 337, Section 301,
and the Escape Clause:  The Case for Less Discretion, 20 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 127 (1987) (argu-
ing for reduced presidential discretion in the context of trade remedies).
95. How section 111(a) accomplishes this task is a bit tricky.  In brief, § 111(a)
amends Title V (i.e., Sub-Chapter V) of the Trade Act of 1974 by adding a new provi-
sion, section 506A, to that Act.  Title V contains the GSP program (19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2461-
2467), and section 506A appears at 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a.  Under section 506A(c) of the
1974 Act (19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(2)), the President must include his country-eligibility
determinations, along with explanations thereof, in his annual AGOA report mandated
by section 106 of AGOA (19 U.S.C.S. § 3705).
96. See Proclamation No. 7350, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,321 (Oct. 2, 2000).
97. These data are current as of August 30, 2005.  The per capita GDP are on PPP
terms. See supra Table 1.
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 31 24-FEB-06 13:27
2006] THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GENEROSITY 329
as of December 31, 2002, but with a delay).98  The remaining
seven countries are not yet eligible for AGOA preferences.
In the event the President determines an SSAC has not met
the criteria, or is “not making continual progress” toward meet-
ing any one of the first six of the eight requirements, the Presi-
dent “shall terminate” the eligibility of that country for AGOA
preferences.99  Termination is effective on January 1 of the year
following the determination.100  If this language—particularly
the italicized words—is taken seriously, then the President has
little discretion but to terminate otherwise eligible countries in
many—maybe most—cases.  Few countries—developed, devel-
oping, or least-developed—make “continual” progress across all
six areas.  Typicaly, change occurs at an erratic pace.  In other
words, only a reading of the termination language that does not
take “continual” literally preserves eligibility.
C. Not All Are Equal
A significant point to note about SSACs designated as eligi-
ble for AGOA preferences—i.e., Eligible SSACs—is they are not
all equal.  That is true in two senses.  First, as intimated at the
outset, eligibility for AGOA preferences is not the same as bene-
ficiary status for GSP treatment (i.e., being a BDC).  That is be-
cause there are eight AGOA eligibility criteria, which are distinct
from the GSP country-eligibility criteria.  Both sets of criteria,
however, must be satisfied to qualify as a Beneficiary SSAC and
thereby become eligible for GSP treatment for non-T&A mer-
chandise and AGOA preferences for T&A articles.
Assume an SSAC satisfies both sets of criteria, and thus not
only is an Eligible SSAC, but also a Beneficiary SSAC.  The sec-
ond sense in which the American statutory scheme treats SSACs
unequally is that not every Beneficiary SSAC automatically gets
duty-free, quota-free treatment on T&A articles.  In reality as well
as in theory, several Beneficiary SSACs neither qualify for nor
actually receive this treatment.  In other words, with respect to
T&A benefits, to be a Beneficiary SSAC is to be a contender, not
a prize-winner.  The list of T&A-eligible Beneficiaries is in chap-
98. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 47 n.48. R
99. 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(b) (emphasis added).
100. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 48-49 (discussing this R
provision).
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ter 98 of the HTSUS.101  It consists of twenty-four of the Eligible
SSACs, namely:  Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ethi-
opia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauri-
tius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Si-
erra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, and
Zambia.
These countries could be called “Beneficiary SSACT&As,”
for “beneficiary Sub-Saharan African country on textile and ap-
parel.”  Indubitably, the increasing length of the acronyms, from
“SSAC” to “SSACT&A,” would be annoying.  However, it would
be more efficient than repeating the jumble of words set out in
the relevant AGOA and GSP provisions.  More importantly, the
extended acronym would illustrate a theme about AGOA—spi-
raling conditionality.  With its eligibility strictures, starting with
being located in a desperately poor region and finishing with
receiving benefits on T&A merchandise, AGOA is anything but
bounteous assistance to bedeviled countries.
What factor delineates Beneficiary SSACs in general from
Beneficiary SSACT&As?  As explained later, the answer is cus-
toms rules on counterfeit documentation and transshipment.
To be a Beneficiary SSACT&A, the United States must deter-
mine a Beneficiary SSAC has implemented procedures, includ-
ing an effective visa system, to prevent unlawful T&A transship-
ment.102  These procedures must conform to the ones set forth
in Chapter 5 of NAFTA.103  When a Beneficiary meets the crite-
ria for T&A preferences, that country is listed on the AGOA web-
site.104
Reference to NAFTA—along with incorporation of GSP
beneficiary requisites—spotlights another theme in AGOA,
namely, “piggy-backing.”  That is, AGOA applies to Beneficiary
SSAC rules in existing regional and PTAs.  There is nothing in-
herently wrong with using rules from one trade agreement in a
different context.  Indeed, the pattern helps avoid a prolifera-
tion of complexity.  However, this maneuver presumes the con-
texts from which the rules are exported and into which they are
imported are broadly similar.  Are other GSP beneficiaries like
101. See HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98-XIX-1, U.S. note 1. R
102. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3722(a)(1)(A) (2005).
103. See NAFTA, supra note 68, at 358. R
104. See U.S. Gov’t Export Portal, Countries Eligible for AGOA Benefits, http://
www.agoa.gov/eligibility/country_eligibility.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).
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SSACs?  Are Canada and Mexico like these countries?  To ask
the question is to suggest the answer that SSA is different be-
cause of its uniquely abject condition.
III. THREE PROBLEMS
God conceals himself from the mind of man,
but reveals himself to his heart.
—African Proverb
A. Economic Dependency?
From the articulation of AGOA country-eligibility require-
ments, three distinct areas of doubt arise.  Taken together, or
even individually, these problems adduce the limits of American
generosity in AGOA.  Significantly, each one is manifest even
before considering the question of “eligibility for what?,” that is,
the substantive preferences treatment.
First, query whether some requirements create a kind of ec-
onomic dependence among Beneficiary SSACs on the United
States—or, perhaps, on developed countries more generally.
Consider the first eligibility requirement.  Adherents to the the-
sis of Francis Fukuyama in The End of History and the Last Man
would agree there is no debate left about the superiority of a
market-based economy over the known, tried alternatives.105  Ad-
herents to the thesis of Hernando de Soto in The Mystery of Capi-
tal:  Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else
would agree protecting private property is a (if not the) key to
economic development.106  However, if a prospective Beneficiary
SSAC undertakes market-based reforms under American pres-
sure to secure AGOA benefits, not at a pace suitable for the local
context, then might one effect of liberalization be greater eco-
nomic dependence, in some respects, on the United States?
For example, the first requirement calls for minimization of
government “interference” in an economy, using examples of
price controls, subsidies, and state-owned assets.  Suppose a Ben-
eficiary SSAC agrees to rapid privatization of all state-owned en-
terprises (“SOEs”).  Is there a risk that U.S. interests and those of
105. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 205-06 (1992).
106. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL:  WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS
IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 6-7 (2000).
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other developed countries will gobble up controlling equity
stakes?  In turn, might prices for goods and services supplied by
the former SOEs—from garbage collection and health care to
telecommunications and water—rise beyond the ability of many
residents in the beneficiary to pay?  Might concomitant service
sector trade liberalization, under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (“GATS”),107 benefit an urban elite relatively
more than other segments of society?  Might the urban and rural
poor in the country be further impoverished, and thereby more
dependent on direct foreign aid?
Consider the third and fourth eligibility requirements.  The
elimination of trade and investment barriers to American ex-
porters and multinational corporations (“MNCs”)—particularly
the call for national treatment, IP protection, and dispute settle-
ment mechanisms—is consistent with obligations in the GATT
and WTO agreements.108  However, those obligations are set out
in multilateral treaties, whereas AGOA is a unilateral, discretion-
ary program.  Likewise, the fourth eligibility requirement calls
for poverty-reduction measures, ranging from educational op-
portunities and physical infrastructure improvements to private
enterprise support and capital markets development.109  They
are sensible enough, though typically found in agreements be-
tween multilateral or regional development banks and borrow-
ing countries.110  Might conditioning of AGOA benefits on satis-
faction of these criteria do more than reinforce the multilateral
obligations?  That is, might they cause a Beneficiary SSAC to fo-
cus particularly on treatment favorable to American commercial
interests?  With attendant trade liberalization in goods and ser-
107. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments—Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
108. See generally RAJ BHALA, MODERN GATT LAW chs. 1-16 (2005) (concerning
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) market access obligations).
109. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(D) (2005); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILA-
TION, supra note 29, at 48. R
110. See generally JOHN W. HEAD, THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZA-
TIONS chs. 2(III), 4 (2005) (evaluating, inter alia, criticisms of the lending operations of
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank); John W. Head, Seven Deadly Sins:  An
Assessment of Criticisms Directed at the International Monetary Fund, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 521
(2004) (concerning the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)); John W. Head, For
Richer or for Poorer:  Assessing the Criticisms Directed at the Multilateral Development Banks, 52
U. KAN. L. REV. 241 (2004) (concerning the World Bank and regional development
banks).
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vices markets, might the consequence be a massive influx of
American goods that dwarfs the ability of African companies to
compete, resulting in dependence on American suppliers?
Might another consequence be reliance on American service
providers for services like education, infrastructure develop-
ment, and commercial and investment banking?
To spin out these scenarios is not to forecast they will occur.
It is also not to challenge the wisdom of multilateral trade liber-
alization, nor to deem true the school of thought in economic
development known as Dependency Theory.111  Rather, the sce-
narios are meant only to give pause for reflection.  Are the first,
third, and fourth eligibility requirements better left to multilat-
eral legal instruments and organizations?  Are they appropriate
in a program—AGOA—that possibly ought to be conceived of as
purely charitable?
B. Political Bullying?
Why impose these political criteria on SSA?  One answer is
to evade the question by saying some of the criteria do not mat-
ter.  That, in practice, some of them may not be real constraints
on designation for AGOA eligibility.  Another answer is AGOA
benefits are a gift to be earned, not an entitlement based on
status as a poor country.  Surely, it is appropriate for a gift-giver
to choose to whom, and why, to give?  A different response, how-
ever, focuses not on the giver, but the recipient. Ought the only
relevant criteria to be income-based, i.e., surely if a country is
poor enough, then it ought to qualify?
Following this line, query whether some AGOA country-eli-
gibility requirements amount to political bullying.  The obvious
affirmative example is the seventh requirement.  It is nothing
more than an effort to impose whatever influential American of-
ficials convince themselves is important at the moment on a
SSAC.  The presence of this condition in AGOA ought to have
been an embarrassment to a great nation.  As for the second,
fifth, and eighth requirements, they embody laudable objectives,
at least some of which are in the interest of SSACs.112  Advance-
ment of the rule of law, respecting human rights, and fighting
111. For discussions of this theory, see, for example, BHALA, supra note 50 (manu- R
script ch. 43).
112. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(B), (a)(1)(E), (a)(3).
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terrorism are illustrations.  They are intrinsically good, and nec-
essary for trade promotion.  That also is true for anti-corruption
drives.
However, is this comment equally true for other aspects of
the second eligibility requirement, namely, political pluralism,
and for the sixth requirement, concerning the protection of
each of the enumerated workers rights, respectively?  The
post–1979 reforms in China offer an example on the sequencing
of political and economic development that runs counter to
these criteria.113  Arguably, developments in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia do, too.114  The point is not to argue against politi-
cal pluralism or worker rights.115  Rather, it is to inquire about
the wisdom of their placement in a PTA, and about what prefer-
ences really are and ought to be about.
C. Social Justice?
Third, and perhaps most deeply troubling, query whether
some eligibility requirements appear incongruous with basic so-
cial justice principles that are, in turn, grounded in deep-seated
religious precepts.  As one faith-based perspective, consider
whether these requirements comport with the pillars of Catholic
social justice theory.  Those pillars are respect for human dig-
nity, promotion of the common good, and the preferential op-
tion for the poor.116  The foundation for all three pillars is self-
less giving—or, in a word, generosity.
It is not difficult to mount a case that the AGOA eligibility
requirements are self-interested, indeed, nakedly so.  To be sure,
there is nothing unethical or irreligious with the fourth and fifth
requirements.117  Calling for poverty-reduction programs
manifests the preferential option for the poor.  Further, de-
manding anti-corruption efforts is sensible gift-giving, as it helps
113. See Alice E.S. Tay & Hamish Redd, China:  Trade, Law and Human Rights, in
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM:  ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 156-72
(Deborah Z. Cass et al. eds., 2003) (analyzing Chinese legal reforms in connection with
its WTO accession).
114. See generally Bhala, supra note 8 (analyzing American demands on the King- R
dom of Saudi Arabia in the context of WTO accession).
115. Regarding the sixth condition, internationally recognized worker rights,
Oxfam International supports the inclusion in labor legislation in SSACs of Interna-
tional Labor Organization (“ILO”) standards. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 31. R
116. For further information on these pillars, see supra note 25. R
117. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a)(1)(D), (a)(1)(E).
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ensure the benefits of duty-free, quota-free treatment flow to in-
tended recipients, namely, African employers and employees re-
sponsible for production and exportation.  The seventh require-
ment, however, evinces a lack of generosity.118  Dignified self-re-
spect might cause an SSAC to balk at this manifestly selfish
condition.
Similarly, the third requirement is designed to help the
United States gain market access in SSA.119  The sixth require-
ment, noble as it sounds, arguably does little more than placate
American labor interests.120  At best, from an American perspec-
tive, it might raise the cost of production in Africa, thereby cut-
ting into a competitive advantage enjoyed by African exporters.
As for the first and second criteria, might they be an effort to
export the models of American capitalism and liberal democ-
racy, to mold the region in the American image?
Socially just regimes do not condition charity on the nature
of the beneficiary.  While it is fair enough to take steps to ensure
the beneficiary does not abuse or squander gifts, it is not appro-
priate to make fine gradations among prospective beneficiaries
based on largely self-interested criteria.  Perhaps the quintessen-
tial model of socially just behavior is the New Testament parable
of the Good Samaritan.  This parable is set forth in Luke:
But because he [a scholar of the law who stood up to test
Jesus] wished to justify himself, he said to Jesus, “And who is
my neighbor?”  Jesus replied, “A man fell victim to robbers as
he went down from Jerusalem to Jericho.  They stripped and
beat him and went off leaving him half-dead.  A priest hap-
pened to be going down that road, but when he saw him, he
passed by on the opposite side.  Likewise a Levite came to the
place, and when he saw him, he passed by on the opposite
side.  But a Samaritan traveler who came upon him was
moved with compassion at the sight.  He approached the vic-
tim, poured oil and wine over his wounds and bandaged
118. See id. § 3703(a)(2).
119. See id. § 3703(a)(1)(C).
120. See Jagdish Bhagwati, An Opportunity for Democrats to Denounce Protectionism, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 10, 2005, at 11 (“Terrified that trade with countries with lower
wages and labour standards will produce more paupers in America by lowering U.S.
wages, and will even reduce American labor standards, the AFL–CIO has long em-
braced the view that workers’ only salvation is to raise the cost of production of compet-
ing industries abroad by requiring them to have the same labour standards as the
U.S.”).
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 38 24-FEB-06 13:27
336 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:299
them.  Then he lifted him up on his own animal, took him to
an inn and cared for him.  The next day he took out two sil-
ver coins and gave them to the innkeeper with the instruc-
tion, ‘Take care of him.  If you spend more than what I have
given you, I shall repay you on my way back.’  Which of these
three, in your opinion, was neighbor to the robbers’ victim?”
He answered, “The one who treated him with mercy.”  Jesus
said to him, “Go and do likewise.”121
Imagine if the Samaritan took the deposition of the man, asking
questions about his origin and nature, how he managed to fall
victim to such a mess, and what plans he had to get out of it.
Imagine, further, if the Samaritan required the man to sign a
contract with him, whereby the man agrees to take certain ac-
tions, refrain from others, and indemnify the innkeeper against
any loss—all because the Samaritan thinks (rightly or wrongly)
these obligations will be good for the man.  Only after signing is
the man eligible for a ride on the Samaritan’s animal, and a res-
pite at the inn.
The consequence would be that the Good Samaritan would
become a Conditional Samaritan.  The man becomes a Servant
mindful of the interests of the Samaritan in exchange for assis-
tance.  Query whether the AGOA eligibility criteria cast the
United States and SSACs, respectively, in the role of Conditional
Samaritan and Servant.
IV. NON-TEXTILE AND APPAREL ARTICLES
When there is no enemy within,
the enemies outside cannot hurt you.
—African Proverb
A. Enhanced GSP Treatment
All SSACs listed in section 107 of AGOA may qualify for reg-
ular and enhanced GSP treatment on non-T&A merchandise.122
To do so, a country must satisfy two sets of requirements.  First, it
must meet all eight criteria (discussed above) in section 104 of
121. Luke 10:29-37 (The Catholic Study Bible).
122. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 46.  Under AGOA III, R
the termination date for GSP benefits for all Beneficiary SSACs is September 30, 2015.
See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466b (2005).
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AGOA,123 and thus be an Eligible SSAC.124  Second, the country
must comply with all of the country-eligibility criteria in section
502 of the GSP statute, and thereby qualify as a Beneficiary
SSAC.125  Put simply, to proclaim SSACs are eligible for regular
and enhanced GSP benefits is to tell only part of the story.  With-
out pointing out they must comply with a double-set of statutory
country-eligibility requirements—rules in AGOA and GSP—that
proclamation is misleadingly generous.
Conversely, any otherwise-eligible SSAC (from the list in sec-
tion 107 of AGOA, above) must be excluded if it fails to satisfy
the GSP criteria for designation as a BDC.  The term “BDC” ap-
plies to any developing or least-developed country satisfying the
GSP country-eligibility rules.  The term “Beneficiary SSAC” is a
BDC located in SSA.  Designation depends on annual monitor-
ing and review by the President, and the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative maintains on its website a list of countries the
President agrees satisfy certain conditions.126  Similarly, the Pres-
ident must terminate beneficiary status to any previously-desig-
nated Beneficiary SSAC if that country fails to make “continual
progress” toward meeting all of the eligibility criteria.127  Thus,
the list of Beneficiary SSACs in the U.S. Code and HTSUS cre-
ates the illusion of permanence to exporters and importers, and
to the governments of the countries.  In fact, Beneficiaries are
such not because they are desperately poor, but because of grace
from a U.S. President.  Each SSAC must earn that grace by satis-
fying requirements consistent with American interests.
How does an SSA country gain status as a “beneficiary” for
GSP treatment on non-T&A merchandise?  The answer is satis-
faction of GSP statutory criteria for BDC status, on which AGOA
piggybacks.  These criteria have existed in the 1974 Act, as
amended, since the United States first implemented its GSP pro-
gram on January 1, 1976.128  These criteria are explained and
analyzed in other sources.129  Summing the limitations, there are
123. 19 U.S.C.S. § 3703(a).
124. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(a)(1)(A).
125. See id. § 2466a(1)(B) (referring to section 502, which is 19 U.S.C.S. § 2462).
126. See id. § 2466a(a)(2); see also U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, U.S. GENERALIZED
SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES GUIDEBOOK 16 (2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_De-
velopment/Preference_Programs/GSP/asset_upload_file209_8359.pdf.
127. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(a)(3).
128. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 15-16. R
129. Summarized, the GSP country-eligibility criteria are as follows:
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• Two Income Criteria:  There are two income-based criteria—
(1) Developed countries are not eligible for preferential trade treatment
under the GSP program.  These countries are Australia, Canada, all
members of the European Union (“EU”), Iceland, Japan, Monaco, New
Zealand, Norway, and Switzerland. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2462(b)(1).
(2) A BDC (or Beneficiary SSAC) may become a “high income” country as
defined by the World Bank, and thereby lose its status as a beneficiary.
See id. § 2462(e).  The cut-off the World Bank uses for “high income” is
a per capita gross national income (“GNI”) of approximately
US$10,066, which covers less than one-sixth of the population of the
world (roughly 29 countries with a population of one million or more,
totaling 0.9 billion people). See World Bank, Country Classification,
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/
0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:64133150~piPK:
64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2005).  Thus,
for example, Bahrain, Brunei, Bermuda, and Nauru have been dropped
from the list.
• Eight Political Considerations:  There is an eight-point list of factors that
render a country ineligible for designation by the President as a BDC—
(1) A communist country is ineligible, unless the country already receives
non-discriminatory (i.e., most-favored nation) treatment from the
United States, is a WTO Member and a member of the IMF, and is “not
dominated or controlled by international communism.” 19 U.S.C.S.
§2462(b)(2)(A).
(2) A country is ineligible if it is a party to an arrangement, the goal of
which is “to withhold supplies of vital commodity resources from inter-
national trade or to raise the price” of the commodity “to an unreasona-
ble level,” and the effect of which is “to cause serious disruption of the
world economy.”  This limitation is for cartels, particularly the Organi-
zation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (“OPEC”). Id.
§ 2462(b)(2)(B).
(3) A country is ineligible if it affords preferential trade treatment to ex-
ports from a developed country other than the United States, and this
treatment “has, or is likely to have, a significant adverse effect” on U.S.
commerce.  This constraint is for “reverse preferences.” Id.
§ 2462(b)(2)(C).
(4) A country is ineligible if it has nationalized or expropriated American
property, including intellectual property (“IP”), or has taken action that
is similar in effect to a nationalization or expropriation (namely, nullify-
ing or repudiating an existing contract, or imposing or enforcing taxes
or restrictive maintenance or operational conditions).  There are three
exceptions:  the country has provided adequate and effective compensa-
tion to the property owner, is in negotiations to provide compensation,
or is engaged in arbitration over compensation.  This “property rights”
limit on eligibility protects not only individual American citizens, but
also any corporation, partnership, or association that is fifty percent or
more owned by a U.S. citizen. See id. § 2462(b)(2)(D).
(5) A country is ineligible if it fails to recognize as binding, or enforce, an
arbitral award in favor of the United States.  This “arbitration” limit pro-
tects individual American citizens, and also any corporation, partner-
ship, or association that is fifty percent or more owned by a U.S. citizen.
See id. § 2462(b)(2)(E).
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(6) A country is ineligible if it aids or abets international terrorism (e.g., by
granting sanctuary from prosecution for an alleged act), or fails to sup-
port the efforts of the United States to combat terrorism. See id.
§ 2462(b)(2)(F).
(7) A country is ineligible if it fails to afford “internationally recognized
worker rights.” Id. § 2462(b)(2)(G).  These rights track the five most
important ones set forth by the ILO:  the right of association; the right
to organize and bargain collectively; a prohibition on forced or compul-
sory labor; a minimum age for the employment of children (as well as a
prohibition on the worst forms of child labor); and acceptable condi-
tions of work (specifically, as to minimum wages, work hours, and safety
and health standards). See id. § 2467(4).  There is no ILO convention
on child soldiers.  In the GSP context, however, this list is not exclusive.
The President must report annually to Congress on the status of inter-
nationally recognized worker rights in each BDC (or Beneficiary SSAC).
See id. § 2464.
(8) A country is ineligible if it “has not implemented its commitments to
eliminate the worst forms of child labor.” Id. § 2462(b)(2)(H).  There
are four “worst forms”:  slavery in any form (e.g., sale, trafficking, debt
bondage, forced or compulsory labor generally or for the armed
forces); prostitution and pornography; illicit activities (e.g., narcotics
production and trafficking); and work that by its nature “is likely to
harm the health, safety, or morals of children.” Id. § 2467(6).  The Pres-
ident’s annual report on the status of internationally recognized worker
rights in each BDC (or Beneficiary SSAC) must include discussion of
efforts to eliminate the worst forms of child labor in that country. See id.
§ 2464; see also LORETTA E. BASS, CHILD LABOR IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 4
(2004) (observing that the highest incidence of child labor is in Africa,
where one out of three children work, and offering a systematic study of
the problem).
• Seven Additional Factors:  There are seven further requirements the Presi-
dent must consider in deciding whether to grant BDC status to a particular
country:
(1) Has the country expressed a desire to be designated a BDC? See 19
U.S.C.S. § 2462(c)(1).
(2) Does the level of economic development of the country, measured by
per capita gross national product (“GNP”), living standards, and other
economic factors the President deems appropriate, make it an appro-
priate designee for BDC status? See id. § 2462(c)(2).
(3) Do other major developed countries extend GSP treatment to the coun-
try? See id. § 2462(c)(3).
(4) To what extent has the country assured the United States “it will provide
equitable and reasonable access to the markets and basic commodity
resources” of the country, and also assured the United States “it will
refrain from engaging in unreasonable export practices”? Id.
§ 2462(c)(4).
(5) To what extent does the country provide “adequate and effective” IP
rights? Id. § 2462(c)(5).
(6) To what extent has the country reduced trade distorting investment
practices (e.g., export performance requirements) and barriers to trade
in services? See id. § 2462(c)(6).
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seventeen in total—two income criteria, eight political consider-
ations, and seven additional factors.130
What help is it to gain status as a Beneficiary SSAC, and
thereby qualify for GSP treatment?  There are four enhance-
ments over regular GSP treatment.  However, asked differently,
is it correct to assert the United States provides more generous
treatment to Beneficiary SSACs than it does to other BDCs
under the GSP?  The answer is clearly “yes” with respect to only
one enhancement—waiver of competitive need limitations.
The GSP statute contains competitive need limitations ap-
plicable to BDCs, which AGOA waives for eligible merchandise
from Beneficiary SSACs.131  Under the GSP program, merchan-
dise eligible for duty-free treatment may be denied that prefer-
ence if it exceeds a threshold export value (US$120 million in
2005) or a threshold percentage (fifty percent) of total im-
ports.132  In effect, once a GSP beneficiary has established an in-
ternational comparative advantage in a category of merchandise,
the United States denies that merchandise preferential treat-
ment.  Along with Beneficiary SSACs, least-developed BDCs also
benefit from this waiver.
On the one hand, the denial makes sense.  The preference
contributed to a strong market position, but its improved market
position evinces a lack of need for continuing the preference.
An ongoing preference might tilt the playing field against other,
non-beneficiary competitors.  On the other hand, why penalize a
GSP beneficiary for solid economic performance?  When re-
(7) To what extent is the country taking steps to afford its workers interna-
tionally recognized worker rights? See id. § 2462(c)(7).
See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 17-19; see also BHALA, supra note R
50 (manuscript ch. 45). R
130. Not all of the political limitations on the President’s discretion are equally
severe.  The President cannot waive the first three limits.  However, the President can
designate a country as a BDC if it is not in full compliance with any one of the last five
restrictions, if that designation “will be in the national economic interest of the United
States.” 19 U.S.C.S. § 2462(b)(2)(H).  While the President must report to Congress on
what would amount to a waiver of one or more of these eligibility criteria, the words
“national economic interest” appear deliberately intended to give the President flexibil-
ity to escape a restriction.  Further, the President must withdraw or suspend designation
(by Executive Order or Presidential Proclamation) of any country as a BDC under
“changed circumstances,” where a country no longer satisfies the political considera-
tions. 19 U.S.C.S. § 2462(d)(2).
131. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2463(c)(2)(D).
132. See id. § 2463(c)(2)(A).
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wards for good behavior stop, or penalties start, the obvious in-
centive is to cease good behavior just before an incentive is re-
moved or a disincentive triggered.  Fortunately for Beneficiary
SSACs, there are no competitive need limitations.  In theory, a
Beneficiary SSAC could gain a commanding position in a partic-
ular American product market, yet continue to receive duty-free
treatment.  Consequently, in AGOA the United States side-
stepped the dilemma associated with removing incentives for
successful market performance.
There are three other enhancements to GSP treatment
AGOA provides.  One concerns product eligibility, and two af-
fect the rule of origin.  As to these differences, the answer to the
question “Is a Beneficiary SSAC ‘really’ better off than a BDC?,”
the answer is “yes and no.”
Regarding product eligibility, some non-T&A articles eligi-
ble for preferences under AGOA would not be eligible for GSP
treatment.  That is, AGOA applies duty-free treatment to a
broader range of products than the GSP program.133  The GSP
statute contains a list of articles considered “import sensitive,”
and thus an actual or potential threat to one or more American
producers.134  Such articles are not eligible for duty-free treat-
ment, even if they originate in a BDC.135  AGOA essentially re-
laxes the strictures of this “Ineligible List” by deleting some
items from it, thereby rendering them eligible for duty-free treat-
ment if they originate in a Beneficiary SSAC.
In particular, if the International Trade Commission
(“ITC”) advises the President any of the following seven broad
categories of merchandise coming from a Beneficiary SSAC are
“not import-sensitive in the context of imports from beneficiary
sub-Saharan African countries” (even if they are import sensitive
from BDCs), then the President may provide duty-free treatment
to the article:136  watches, import-sensitive electronics, import-
sensitive steel, footwear, leather goods (handbags, luggage, flat
goods, work gloves, and wearing apparel), import-sensitive semi-
manufactured and manufactured glass products, and any other
133. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 94. R
134. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2463(b)(1); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra
note 29, at 19. R
135. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 20. R
136. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(b)(1).
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articles that are import sensitive in the context of the GSP pro-
gram.
These seven categories are a subset of the articles on the
statutory “Ineligible List.”137  Under AGOA, articles in these cate-
gories are not automatically presumed to be import sensitive, in-
sofar as their source is a Beneficiary SSAC.  Rather, there is a
possibility of showing they pose no actual or potential threat to
domestic producers, in which case they may receive duty-free
treatment.138
The two final AGOA enhancements to GSP-type treatment
for Beneficiary SSACs concerns origination.  As a general pro-
position, a rule (or rules) of origin is necessary in any PTA to
ensure the benefits of the arrangement, namely, duty-free treat-
ment accrued to the intended beneficiaries.  Without origin re-
quirements, the PTA would not make beneficiaries better off
than competitors in third countries.139  Accordingly, in the GSP
statute, the basic rule of origin is a thirty-five percent value ad-
ded test.140  Essentially, the sum of (1) the cost or value of mater-
ials produced in a BDC and (2) the direct costs of processing
operations in a BDC must equal or exceed thirty-five percent of
the value of an article as appraised by the U.S. Customs and Bor-
der Protection (“CBP”) (formerly, the Customs Service).141  The
article itself must be imported directly from the BDC to the
United States.  The AGOA rule of origin essentially tracks the
general GSP rule.142
Under AGOA, however, this quantitative test benchmark is
relaxed a bit, by allowing for up to fifteen percent of the ap-
praised value of an article to consist of materials produced in the
United States.143  In other words, if fifteen percent (or less) of
the cost or value of inputs used in a product made in a Benefici-
ary SSAC comes from American raw materials or intermediate
137. See id. § 2463(b)(1); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, R
at 19.
138. See Proclamation No. 7388, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,723 (Dec. 18, 2000) (listing the
articles determined by the President not to be import-sensitive in the context of imports
from Beneficiary SSACs, and thus eligible for duty-free treatment).
139. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 60. R
140. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2463(a)(2)(A).
141. See id.
142. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 91; see also TAYLOR, supra note 44, at R
37.
143. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(b)(2)(A).
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goods, a question arises as to whether this amount should qualify
in reaching the thirty-five percent value added threshold.  The
answer for a BDC seeking GSP treatment is “no.”  More pre-
cisely, applying the Torrington dual substantial transformation
rule, the answer is “no, unless the American inputs are trans-
formed substantially in the BDC into a new and different article,
thereby conferring origination on them.”144  The answer under
AGOA, however, is “yes.”
Further, under AGOA, the cost or value of materials pro-
duced in a current or former Beneficiary SSAC counts toward
meeting the thirty-five percent value added test.145  A former
Beneficiary is one that lost its status because it entered into an
FTA with the United States.146  The United States has been nego-
tiating an FTA with the Southern African Customs Union
(“SACU”) for approximately four years, and Congress declares
in AGOA its interest in FTAs with SSACs.147  Yet, the United
States currently has no FTA with any Beneficiary, and none ap-
pears likely any earlier than the end of 2006.148  Nonetheless,
144. See, e.g., Torrington Co. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
145. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(b)(2)(B).
146. See id. § 2466a(c)(2); see also Eric J. Boos, Between Scylla and Charybdis:  The
Changing Nature of U.S. and EU Development Policy and Its Effects on the Least Developed
Countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 181, 207-08 (2003) (discuss-
ing the AGOA provisions that create a framework for trade agreements between the
United States and SSACs, but questioning the congressional intent behind AGOA and
arguing that a genuine commitment to economic development in SSAC “appears to be
lacking” because (1) “[t]he market-led arrangement completely favors the United
States,” (2) some benefits already existed for certain SSACs, particularly Gabon, Nige-
ria, and South Africa, and (3) “the United States only allows sub-Saharan African na-
tions to participate in global markets in which they are at such a competitive disadvan-
tage that they pose virtually no threat whatsoever”).
147. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3723(a) (2005).
148. See id.  The remainder of this section of the statute concerns planning for the
negotiations of an FTA with Beneficiary SSACs, and the subsequent section, title 19,
section 3724 of the United States Code, creates the position of an Assistant USTR for
African Affairs.  The Southern African Customs Union (“SACU”) members are Bot-
swana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.  The United States declared its
intention to negotiate an FTA with SACU in November 2002. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES
COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 57-58.  In the summer of 2005, the United States and R
SACU members agreed to meet every six to eight weeks until the end of 2006 to resolve
specific issues.  Working groups exist in the areas such as agricultural market access,
non-agricultural market access, dispute settlement, electronic commerce, environmen-
tal rights, intellectual property rights, labor rights, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
services, and technical barriers to trade.  Major impediments to expeditious progress on
an FTA, according to both the United States and SACU members, have been the differ-
ing stages of development of those members, the lack of history of common policy
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inputs from any SSAC that is or was a Beneficiary may qualify in
meeting this Test.  There is no quantitative limit (such as fifteen
percent) on how many may be included.
In contrast, under the normal thirty-five percent Test, a
BDC can count the cost or value of materials produced in the
territory of another BDC only if the other BDC is a member of
the same association of countries, i.e., an FTA or customs union,
and the member BDCs are treated as a single country.149  The
same limitation—membership in a common FTA or customs
union—applies to counting the direct costs of processing opera-
tions in its territory or in the territory of these other countries.150
However, a BDC cannot count the value of an input from a BDC
with which it does not share membership in a FTA or customs
union toward meeting the thirty-five percent Test.  In that in-
stance, the input—to count—must be substantially transformed
into a new and different article of commerce in the BDC seeking
GSP treatment.151
B. How Enhanced Are the Enhancements?
How generous are the AGOA exceptions to the GSP Ineligi-
ble List?  Aside from the waiver of competitive need limitations,
“not very” is a possible response.  Even this waiver could be con-
sidered insignificant on a showing that few if any Beneficiary
SSACs would come close to the limits in the foreseeable future.
Consider three legal facts.
First, there are two categories of articles on the Ineligible
List for which the possibility of duty-free treatment under AGOA
does not exist:152
1. Certain target articles:  Articles subject to a trade remedy
action, specifically, a safeguard remedy or national security
action.
2. Certain agricultural products:  The quantity of agricultural
articles subject to a tariff rate quota that exceeds the in-
quota threshold.
among them, and the evolving nature of SACU as an entity. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. to
Hold Free Trade Talks with SACU Countries Sept. 27-29, 22 I.T.R. (BNA) 1481-82 (Sept. 15,
2005).
149. See 19 U.S.C.S. §§ 2463(a)(2)(A)(ii), 2467(2).
150. See id.
151. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 50. R
152. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2463(b)(2)-(3).
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Second, even though T&A articles are eligible for AGOA
benefits despite being on the GSP Ineligible List, actual receipt
of the benefits hinges on satisfying rules of origin.153  These rules
(discussed below) tend not only to be complicated, but also to
serve the self-interest of American producers of certain T&A in-
puts.  Put differently, to say the President has the discretion to
extend duty-free treatment to all classes of merchandise from an
SSA beneficiary country, except T&A products, would be mis-
leading.154
Third, and most importantly, the AGOA exceptions do not
confer eligibility for duty-free treatment—only potential eligibil-
ity.  The United States will not admit an excepted article if that
article is import sensitive.155  The essential test—import sensitiv-
ity—applies, whether an article is from a BDC outside of SSA
and seeks duty-free treatment under the GSP program, or from a
Beneficiary SSAC and seeks this treatment under AGOA.156  In-
deed, some of the above-listed seven categories in the AGOA ex-
ceptions seem hardly to matter.  For instance, an electronics arti-
cle, steel article, semi-manufactured or manufactured glass arti-
cle, or any other article that is not import sensitive arguably
would be eligible for GSP treatment.
That is because the article would not fit into the Ineligible
List, given the lack of import sensitivity.  Consequently, for
AGOA to state electronics, steel, glass, or other products that are
not import sensitive get duty-free treatment does not change the
essential test—showing no import sensitivity.  The difference, in
practice, is whether gauging import sensitivity in the focused
context of Beneficiary SSACs renders an article not sensitive, in
comparison with the relatively broader context of imports of the
article from GSP beneficiaries.  The answer is an empirical one.
If a Beneficiary SSAC is an actual or potential significant pro-
ducer and exporter of the product to the United States, then the
chances of an affirmative import sensitivity determination are in-
creased.
As for the other two enhancements, concerning the AGOA
rule of origin, how generous are they?  At first glance, the flexi-
153. See id. § 2463(b)(1).
154. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 94. R
155. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 2466a(b)(1).
156. See id.; see also id. § 2463(b)(1).
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bility afforded by AGOA to include American materials, up to
fifteen percent, toward meeting the thirty-five percent Value Ad-
ded Test sounds helpful.  It alleviates the need to comply with
the Torrington dual substantial transformation test.  A Beneficiary
SSAC can import American inputs and plug them directly into
the production process, without having to transform them sub-
stantially into a distinct article.  Stated differently, with a dual
requirement, apparel would qualify as originating in a Benefici-
ary only if the transformation from yarn to fabric, and from
fabric to apparel, occurred in that Beneficiary.  Without the re-
quirement, the single transformation in the Beneficiary from
American fabric to apparel confers origin in the Beneficiary.157
But, closer inspection suggests this flexibility is not necessa-
157. Some T&A terminology is in order now, and for the subsequent discussion of
preferences on T&A articles.  “Yarn” is a product of substantial length, but relatively
thin cross-section, comprised of interlocking fibers, and is used to produce textiles, as
well as for sewing, knitting, weaving, and rope making. See 12 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRITANNICA, supra note 17, at 823 (entry for “yarn”); see also IndiaMART Apparel Por- R
tal’s Textile Terminology, http://apparel.indiamart.com/lib/textile/terminol-
ogy09171998.html (entry for “Yarn”) (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).  Yarn is made by either
a spinning or air texturizing (“taslanizing”) process. See 12 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITAN-
NICA, supra note 17, at 823 (entry for “yarn”).  Essentially, a yarn is made from twisting R
plies together, with each ply being a single thread.  The final yarn is a result of twisting
or plying the threads together. See id.  In brief, “yarn” is simply “thin fibers spun to-
gether.” See id.  A “thread,” then, is a thin yarn used to make textiles, and of course in
sewing. See 11 NEW ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 17, at 735 (entry for R
“thread”).  “Fibers” are materials that are continuous or discrete elongated pieces, simi-
lar to thread.  They are used in the production of other materials, and can be spun into
thread, as well as rope or filaments.  Fibers may be natural, such as vegetable fibers like
cotton, hemp, jute, and linen, or animal fibers like hair, silk, or wool, or they may be
man-made (for example, acrylic, nylon, polyester, rayon, or spandex). See 4 id. at 759
(entry for “fibre”).  Synthetic fibers, which are a subset of man-made fibers, are made
from a chemical process, and sometimes are called “filaments.” See id.  “Fabric” is a
generic term used for all flexible materials made of fibers or yarns.  Fabric may be made
through a variety of processes, including weaving (which typically is mechanized, and
involves one of many types of loom), knitting (on machine or by hand), lace minding
(involving knitting machines, hand, or both), braiding (i.e., plaiting), felting (involving
matting and pressing fibers together to make cloth), bonding, fusing, or inter-locking.
See India Mart, Indian Apparel Portal, Textile Terminology, http://apparel.indiamart.
com/lib/textile/terminology09171998.html (entry for “Fabric”) (last visited Nov. 17,
2005); see also Textile—Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Textile (entry for “Production methods”) (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).  “Cloth” and
“materials” are synonyms for “fabric.” See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE EN-
GLISH LANGUAGE 350 (4th ed. 2000) (entries for “Cloth,” “Fabric”).  Obviously, there are
many types of fabric, including burlap, calico, canvas, corduroy, denim, flannel, gabar-
dine, gingham, linen, muslin, satin, silk, twill, velvet, and worsted. See id. at 350 (entry
for “Cloth”).
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rily generous to Beneficiary SSACs.  Rather, the flexibility in cal-
culating value added creates an incentive that favors American
exporters.  They can sell inputs to a Beneficiary knowing that
their cost or value qualifies in the thirty-five percent value added
test.  If the Beneficiary would have sourced inputs from Ameri-
can exporters without this incentive to do so, i.e., based on mar-
ket factors like price and quality, then the incentive does not
distort trade.  However, if the Beneficiary substitutes away from
lower priced, higher quality inputs from non-American sources,
then trade distortion occurs.  Moreover, that trade distortion can
lead to dependence of Beneficiaries on American sources.
As for the third enhancement, allowing inclusion of the cost
or value of materials from other Beneficiary SSACs to qualify in
computing value added in any one Beneficiary is helpful.  It en-
courages cross-border integration of production among Benefi-
ciaries, which may lead to FTAs, customs unions, or at least a
strengthened regional economy.  Arguably, however, this en-
hancement does not go far enough.  It does not allow for inclu-
sion of the direct costs of processing operations in another Bene-
ficiary.
Suppose, for instance, cocoa grown in Ghana is shipped to
Senegal, where it is cleaned and turned into chocolate powder.
The powder is exported to Ethiopia, where it is blended with
coffee beans to make a new kind of chocolate coffee drink.  Ethi-
opia seeks duty-free treatment under AGOA for the finished
drink product.  Under the AGOA rule, to reach thirty-five per-
cent value added, the cost of cocoa from Ghana counts.  But,
assuming the cleaning and “powderizing” in Senegal are process-
ing, the costs associated with them do not count.  A more gener-
ous enhancement would not treat the cost of materials favorably
and discriminate against processing.  That is, it would allow for
all steps in a production chain to qualify.
A conceptually different point about generosity, or lack
thereof, in the AGOA rule of origin goes to an inherency of a
value-added test.  A value-added test has the virtue of conceptual
simplicity, but the vice of discriminating against low-cost coun-
tries.  They are inexpensive production venues, and value-added
is measured in a hard currency like the U.S. dollar.  When the
costs of production in a local currency of a Beneficiary SSAC are
summed up and converted into dollars, the result may be paltry.
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The figures may not sum up to thirty-five percent in, say, Gabon
as quickly as a GSP beneficiary like Indonesia.
V. SOME BASICS ABOUT APPAREL ARTICLES
Everybody has been young before,
but not everybody has been old before.
—African Proverb
A. The Production Process
Certain—but not all—T&A merchandise may receive duty-
free, quota-free treatment from the United States; however, as
the CBP itself states, “strict conditions” must be met to qualify.158
To the uninitiated, and even to the experienced international
trade lawyer, these conditions appear to be a dizzying array of
preferential rules of origin, the rationale for which is protection
of T&A interests in the United States producing articles that are
like or directly competitive with merchandise from a T&A Bene-
ficiary.  The appearance is not deceiving.
That said, it is not a mere conclusive assertion, nor a rigor-
ous criticism, to say AGOA textile rules of origin are “ungener-
ous,” or to say they are “too restrictive.”  There is a protectionist
devil afflicting T&A Beneficiaries, but how does that devil oper-
ate?  The answer is in the details of the T&A rules of origin (dis-
cussed later).  To be sure, limited space does not permit an ex-
plication of each rule.159  Indeed, by one count of the rules of
origin in Chapter 98 of the HTSUS, there are ten such rules—a
few broad ones, and several sub-sets of rules.
For now, to understand the different AGOA categories of
rules of origin for apparel articles, it is important to recall the six
basic steps in making T&A.  That is because the AGOA T&A
158. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 91 (emphasis added).  Since the R
date of this publication, and following changes made concerning homeland security in
the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. Customs Service has been
renamed the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”).  The CBP website contains
detailed information about AGOA import procedures. See CBP, http://www.customs.
gov (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).  In addition, the Office of Textiles and Apparel
(“OTEXA”) of the DOC maintains current data on (1) the apparel cap, (2) fabric and
yarn not available in commercial quantities in the U.S., and (3) hand-loomed, hand-
made folklore articles on its website. See OTEXA, http://otexa.ita.doc.gov/ (last visited
Nov. 17, 2005).
159. See HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98-XIX-1. R
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rules of origin are specified process rules, not value-added rules.
In other words, in order for the finished merchandise to qualify
for preferential treatment, these rules demand that particular
production activity occur in a T&A Beneficiary.  The basic steps
are:
Step 1:  Growing cotton or other fiber as raw materials, or
manufacturing synthetic fibers, such as nylon or rayon.  A rule of
origin demanding all production activity from this step onward
occur in one location is called a “Fiber Forward Rule.”160  This kind
of Rule is the most restrictive of all T&A specified process re-
quirements.  All economic activity must occur in one country,
otherwise the finished article is considered not to originate in
that country and, therefore, is disqualified from preferential
treatment.  In turn, the more restrictive a preferential rule of
origin, the more protectionist it is.  By making it difficult to ob-
tain duty-free, quota-free treatment, a tighter rule confers
greater protection on domestic (e.g., American) producers of
like merchandise.
In theory, a “Seed Forward” or “Fertilizer Forward” Rule
could be devised to afford even greater protection than a Fiber
Forward Rule.  The idea would be to require the seeds used to
plant cotton (or other fiber), or the fertilizer used to help the
crop grow, to originate in the same country in which all further
activity occurs.  Failure would mean the finished article would
not qualify as originating in that country, hence duty-free, quota-
free treatment would be devised.  In practice, such a rule does
not exist.
Step 2:  Spinning yarn from fiber.  A requirement that all ac-
tivity from this step onward occur in a particular country is a
“Yarn Forward Rule.”161  A Yarn Forward Rule is the second most
restrictive—and thereby protectionist—type of specified process
requirement.  In effect, it is used in AGOA, for instance, in the
first and second of the preference categories (discussed below),
in combination with Assembly Rules (also discussed below).
Step 3:  Making fabric (also called cloth) from yarn.  A man-
date that all activity from this step onward occur in a particular
160. See U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, WHAT EVERY MEMBER OF THE
TRADE COMMUNITY SHOULD KNOW ABOUT:  NAFTA TEXTILES AND TEXTILES ARTICLES
(2005), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/toolbox/legal/in-
formed_compliance_pubs/textiles/icp003r2.ctt/icp003.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
161. See id.
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country is a “Fabric Forward Rule.”162  A cursory glance at the first,
second, third, seventh, and eighth AGOA preferential treatment
categories suggests they rely (to varying degrees) on Fabric For-
ward Rules.  However, the categories are in fact constructed in a
protectionist manner, because of requirements about yarn.
A garment that is knit does not technically go through the
fabric stage.  The original AGOA legislation did not specify knit-
to-shape garments as eligible for duty-free treatment, and the
CBP issued draft regulations stipulating that they were ineligi-
ble.163  AGOA II contained a “knit-to-shape amendment” clarify-
ing knit-to-shape apparel is eligible.164
Step 4:  Cutting fabric into pieces (or knitting to shape).  A
rule calling for all activity from this step onward to occur in a
particular country is called “Cutting Forward.”  Generally, a Cut-
ting Forward origin rule is more liberal than Fiber, Yarn, or
Fabric Forward Rules, because it allows activity in the early stages
of the chain of production to occur in countries other than the
potential beneficiary of preferential treatment.  The second and
sixth AGOA preference categories use a variant of a Cutting For-
ward Rule.  However (as discussed below), in AGOA, the variants
are protectionist because of requirements concerning yarn.  The
fourth AGOA preference category also uses a Cutting Forward
Rule, albeit for knitting to shape sweaters.
Depending on the garment, cutting may occur in more than
one country—so-called “hybrid cutting.”165  The original AGOA
legislation did not specify that apparel made in a hybrid cutting
process was eligible for duty-free treatment.166  The CBP issued
draft regulations that would have denied eligibility.167  AGOA II
contained amendments allowing for preferential treatment for
apparel cut both in the United States and in a Beneficiary
162. See id.
163. See generally Freeing Up Trade:  AGOA II, U.S. CUSTOMS TODAY (U.S. Customs
Svc., Nov. 2002) [hereinafter Freeing Up Trade], available at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/
CustomsToday/2002/November/african.xml.
164. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 51 (identifying item R
1).
165. See Freeing Up Trade, supra note 163. R
166. See id.; AGOA—BEFORE AND AFTER, http://www.agoa.gov/faq/AGOA_com-
parison_table.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2005).
167. See id.
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SSAC.168
Step 5:  Sewing pieces of cut fabric together.  An obligation
that all activity from this step onward to occur in a particular
country is a “Sewing Forward Rule.”  This kind of rule is relatively
liberal, i.e., not as protectionist as the previous rules, as it per-
mits all previous steps to occur in other countries.  Sometimes,
cutting and sewing are considered parts of the same operation,
and the attendant rule is “Cutting and Sewing Forward.”
A variation of the Sewing Forward Rule exists in AGOA,
namely, in the second and sixth preference categories.  How-
ever, the variations are protectionist.  In the second preferential
category, the sewing thread must come from the United States,
and in the sixth preferential category, non-U.S. fabric or yarn
may be used only if it is in short supply in the United States.169
Step 6:  Assembling pieces into a finished article (i.e., final
assembly).  A rule calling only for assembly to occur in a particu-
lar country—an “Assembly Rule”—is the most liberal of all speci-
fied process rules, in that it requires the least amount of eco-
nomic activity to occur in the country seeking preferential treat-
ment.  The fourth AGOA preference category essentially fits this
type.  Ostensibly, the first and third categories are Assembly
Rules.  However (as explained below), strictures embedded in
these categories concerning where fabric is from and cutting oc-
curs render them considerably more restrictive than a simple As-
sembly Rule.
As intimated above, the AGOA preference categories are
not pure in the sense of relying entirely on one kind of process
forward occurring in a T&A Beneficiary.  Rather, as explained in
detail below, the categories are hybrids, blending different kinds
of specified process rules.
B. Four Preliminary Hurdles
Before turning to the AGOA rules of origin for apparel, and
considering the extent to which they embody a protectionist
stance toward exports from T&A Beneficiary SSACs, it is worth
observing “there is more than just the rules of origin.”  Even if
an article fits within one of the categories for duty-free treat-
168. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 51 (identifying item R
2).
169. See 19 C.F.R. § 10.213 (2005).
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ment, the United States does not automatically accord that arti-
cle an AGOA preference.  Regardless of the category in which
the article fits, there are two additional hurdles to cross after the
rule of origin is satisfied.  These hurdles are set out in the regula-
tions of the CBP.170
The first hurdle concerns documents.  Essentially, AGOA in-
corporates by reference, and imposes on Beneficiary SSACs, the
customs procedures concerning documentation in Chapter Five
of NAFTA.171  The essential procedures, contained in NAFTA
Article 502(1), are that an importer cannot obtain duty-free,
quota free treatment without:  A written declaration, based on a
valid Certificate of Origin, stating the good qualifies as originat-
ing; possessing the Certificate when making the declaration; pro-
viding upon request of the relevant customs authority a copy of
the Certificate; and promptly furnishing a corrected declaration
and paying duties owed if the importer has reason to believe the
Certificate contains erroneous information.172  In practice,
therefore, an importer seeking an AGOA preference must pre-
sent specific documents to the CBP, most notably, a Certificate
of Origin, which declares the T&A article in question originates
in a Beneficiary SSAC.173
No Certificate of Origin is valid, however, unless the Presi-
dent determines the exporting country not only is a Beneficiary,
but also has implemented and is following (or is making substan-
tial progress toward implementing and following) the NAFTA
Chapter Five rules.  The Certificate itself provides written evi-
dence the country of export is a Beneficiary SSAC and the article
in question originates in that country and, therefore, qualifies
for duty-free treatment.174  Any exporter determined by the Pres-
ident to engage in transshipment (i.e., claiming a preference for
170. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 10.211–.217.
171. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3722(b)(2) (2005).
172. See NAFTA, supra note 68, art. 502(1); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILA- R
TION, supra note 29, at 55 n.59. R
173. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3722(b)(2).
174. In limited circumstances, described in Article 503 of NAFTA, no Certificate of
Origin is needed. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3722(b)(2).  In brief, under Article 503, as imple-
mented in U.S. law, no Certificate is required for an article imported from Mexico if
the article is (1) a commercial product whose value is US$1000 or less (or a higher de
minimis threshold, if a NAFTA Party requires), though an invoice may be required, (2)
a non-commercial good worth less than US$1000 (or more, if the importing Party estab-
lishes a higher threshold), or (3) a good for which the importing Party has waived the
requirement of a Certificate.  A Certificate will be required, however, if an importer
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an article based on “material” false information about the coun-
try of origin, manufacture, processing, or assembly of that article
or any of its components, where “material” means information
that, if disclosed, would show the article is ineligible for duty-free
treatment) results in the exporter losing all AGOA benefits for
five years.175  Significantly, the penalty is targeted at individual
exporters (and their successors and affiliates), not an entire Ben-
eficiary SSAC.
The second hurdle concerns visas.  Even though an SSAC is
a Beneficiary and eligible for AGOA preferences on T&A arti-
cles, it cannot realize the benefits of duty-free treatment unless it
has adopted an effective visa system in its local law, and imple-
mented enforcement procedures, to prevent unlawful transship-
ment and the use of counterfeit documents.176  There are a
number of complementary obligations.  For instance, the Benefi-
ciary SSAC adopt domestic laws on transshipment to allow “ver-
ification teams” from the CBP access “to investigate thoroughly”
allegations of transshipment through that country.177  The Bene-
ficiary must agree to provide timely reports to the CBP (on re-
quest) on imports and exports of articles covered by AGOA, co-
operate fully with the CBP to prevent circumvention, and ensure
its producers and exporters maintain complete records about
AGOA–covered articles for at least two years after the articles are
manufactured.178  It also must provide to the CBP (again, on re-
quest) documentation on the country of origin of these articles
(e.g., certifications from manufacturers and exporters, informa-
tion about place of production, the number and identify of
workers and machinery used in production, and other produc-
tion records).179  As with the first hurdle, the President holds the
authority to make determinations as to whether a Beneficiary
SSAC has an efficient visa.180
Neither of the first two hurdles is unreasonable or insur-
structures a series of transactions in a way to evade the obligation. See NAFTA, supra
note 68, art. 503; see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 56 n.61. R
175. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3722(b)(3)-(4).
176. See id. § 3722(a)(1)(A).
177. See id. § 3722(a)(1)(B).
178. See id. § 3722(a)(1)(C)-(E).
179. See id. § 3722(a)(1)(F), (a)(2); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 55. R
180. As to both hurdles, the President has delegated this authority to the USTR.
See Proclamation No. 7350, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,321 (Oct. 4, 2000).
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mountable.  While there may be some question about imposing
NAFTA obligations on AGOA Beneficiaries, protections against
transshipment hardly are objectionable.  To the contrary, they
help ensure the benefits of duty-free treatment flow to the in-
tended producers and exporters.  There even is a positive exter-
nality associated with the second hurdle—improved record-
keeping in the governmental and private sectors in Beneficiary
SSACs.  Thus, the point is not the first two hurdles are unjusti-
fied.  Indeed, there is multilateral textual precedent for combat-
ing T&A transshipment.  Article 5 of the WTO Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing (“ATC”), which was in force between Janu-
ary 1, 1995 and December 31, 2004, contained anti-transship-
ment provisions calling for investigation of suspected circumven-
tion, including exchanging documents and other information,
and facilitating plant visits.181  Rather, the point is that as hur-
dles, they raise the time, expense, and difficulty associated with
gaining AGOA benefits.  Fortunately, AGOA obligates the CBP
to provide technical assistance to Beneficiary SSACs to help
them cross these hurdles.182  The United States bears the ex-
pense of this assistance (allocating roughly US$5.9 million for
this purpose).183
A third hurdle concerns “findings and trimmings.”  This
term refers to items frequently added to apparel articles, such as
bow buds, buttons, decorative lace trim, elastic strips (that are
less than one inch width and used in the production of bras),
eyes, hooks, labels, sewing thread, snaps, zippers, and zipper
tapes.184  In theory, the United States could argue apparel assem-
bled in a T&A Beneficiary using any findings and trimmings that
are neither from the United States nor from a Beneficiary does
not originate within the Beneficiary and, therefore, is ineligible
for duty-free treatment under AGOA.
To its credit, the United States does not take such a strict
approach.  Rather, it permits some room for sourcing findings
and trimmings in third countries.  A T&A Beneficiary is free to
181. See Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, art. 2.8, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal Instru-
ments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
182. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3722(c).
183. See id. § 3722(d).
184. See id. § 3721(d)(1)(A); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note
29, at 53. R
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use findings and trimmings from a third country, but only up to
twenty-five percent of the costs of the components of the assem-
bled article.185  If the value of findings and trimmings exceeds
twenty-five percent, then the article is ineligible for an AGOA
preference.  For purposes of the second preference category
(discussed below), however, thread is not considered a finding
or trimming.186  In practice, that means the thread must be from
the United States.
Also to its credit, the United States exempts certain small
components from the strictures of the preference categories,
and provides a de minimis exception relevant to most of those
categories.  An article that fits within one of the preference cate-
gories remains eligible for duty-free treatment, even if certain of
its components are from a third country (i.e., outside the United
States or a Beneficiary SSAC).  Those components are belts at-
tached to an article, collars, cuffs, drawstrings, elbow patches,
elastic straps, shoulder pads, and waistbands.187  In other words,
a T&A Beneficiary is free to source these components from any
country.  Further, several of the preference categories require
use of fiber and yarn from the United States, a Beneficiary, or a
former Beneficiary.  Notwithstanding this stricture, up to ten
percent of the total weight of all fibers or yarns can come from a
third country.188  As the de minimis threshold under AGOA and
AGOA II was seven percent, the AGOA III threshold is relatively
more liberal.189
Interlinings pose a fourth hurdle to an African producer/
exporter seeking AGOA preferences.  Like the other hurdles,
this hurdle illustrates the underlying and overwhelming ten-
dency of the United States, through the details of AGOA, to
keep a watchful protective eye on domestic producer interests,
and favor them over poorer African counterparts on even the
smallest of items.
To what extent is a T&A Beneficiary able to include third-
country interlinings in apparel, and not risk losing duty-free
185. See § 3721(d)(1)(A); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note
29, at 53. R
186. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(d)(1)(C); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 54. R
187. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(d)(3).
188. See id. § 3721(d)(2).
189. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 54. R
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treatment?  The answer is that up to twenty-five percent of the
cost of components of an assembled article may include interlin-
ings that originate in neither the United States nor a Benefici-
ary.190  However, the twenty-five percent threshold covers only
three kinds of interlinings:  chest-type plates; “hymo” pieces; and
“sleeve headers.”191  All three must be woven (or weft-inserted
warp knit construction) from coarse animal hair or man-made
filaments.192  All other interlinings must be from the United
States or a Beneficiary.  Moreover, at any point the President can
terminate the allowance for third-country interlinings if he de-
termines there are American manufacturers producing (in the
United States) interlinings in commercial quantities.193  Put suc-
cinctly, the rule on interlinings is that only a few of them can be
from a third country, only up to twenty-five percent of the value
of the article in which they are used, and only if Americans do
not make them.  Otherwise, use of a third-country interlining
renders an article ineligible for duty-free treatment.
VI. APPAREL RULES OF ORIGIN AND THE
PROTECTIONIST DEVIL
There is always something new out of Africa.
—Pliny the Elder
The inquiry, then, about generosity towards desperately
poor Beneficiary SSACs becomes—in the context of T&A—an
examination of how the protectionist devil operates in the de-
tails of rules of origin.  There are eight categories of apparel arti-
cles potentially eligible for duty-free, quota-free treatment under
AGOA (the preference titles listed below are unofficial, they are
mnemonic aids to summarize the gist of the category).194  Ap-
190. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(d)(B)(i); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 54. R
191. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(d)(B)(ii); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 54. R
192. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(d)(B)(ii); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION,
supra note 29, at 54. R
193. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(d)(B)(iii).  The President has delegated this authority
to the Committee for Implementation of Textile Agreements (“CITA”). See Exec. Order
No. 13,191, 66 Fed. Reg. 7271 (Jan. 22, 2001).  CITA also is responsible for setting
annual caps on apparel eligible for duty-free AGOA benefits.  Thus, for example, CITA
published a new twelve-month AGOA import cap at 70 Fed. Reg. 56,165 (Sept. 26,
2005).
194. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(1)-(6) (outlining eight categories of T&A prod-
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parel from a T&A producer/exporter in a Beneficiary SSAC
must fit within a category if, upon entry into the United States,
its apparel exports are to benefit from duty-free, quota-free treat-
ment.  Examining each category reveals how the devil operates,
and why the rules are properly characterized—from the perspec-
tive of T&A Beneficiary SSACs—as a “devil.”
Briefly, of the eight categories, the first four categories, and
the eighth category, call for some activity to occur in a T&A Ben-
eficiary using inputs from the United States (or, in the third and
seventh category, from a Beneficiary).  The sixth category obvi-
ates the need for American inputs only if they are in short sup-
ply.  The fifth and seventh categories, dealing respectively with
sweaters and cultural products, are not as commercially impor-
tant as the other categories.  While the rules of origin are highly
technical, the theme emerging from them is evident enough.
In the details of the origin rules of the first, second, third,
fourth, sixth, and eighth AGOA preference categories, lives (in-
deed, thrives) the protectionist devil—and, in turn, is manifest
in America’s generosity, or lack thereof, toward T&A Benefi-
ciaries.  A donor shows most poignantly its generous spirit in the
areas in which it faces the largest potential sacrifice, as does
America in these categories.  To be sure, generosity in a prefer-
ential trading program does not demand economic martyrdom.
But, generosity is greater when it is not convenient or easy for a
donor, and when it does not put undue strictures on the benefi-
ciary to suit the commercial self-interest of the donor.  Yet,
again, the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth categories bear
the most restrictive origin rules.  Might the explanation lie in the
prospect American producers are considerably less likely to pro-
duce merchandise that is like or directly competitive with articles
in the fifth and seventh categories?
After all, as the examination below reveals, at least prima
facie, the fifth category appears drafted in a way to exclude
sweaters made in a T&A Beneficiary that could substitute for
American-made sweaters.  Possibly, a rule about using American
cashmere or wool whose diameter is 21.5 microns or less does
not exist in AGOA, because it would be unnecessary, as few (if
any) such inputs are made in the United States.  As for the sev-
ucts); see also U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 94-95 (describing six broad catego- R
ries of T&A articles).
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enth category, while there no doubt are American-made hand-
loomed, hand-made, or folklore articles, and ethnic printed
fabrics, such production is of small volume and not substitutable
for African-made handicraft items.  In contrast, precisely where
American producers are most likely to be challenged—in the
first, second, third, fourth, sixth, and eighth categories, which
have the broadest potential array of merchandise—the origin
rules are crafted to confer not generosity toward African produc-
ers and exporters, but protection for American producers of like
or directly competitive products.
It is important to appreciate the particular relevance of the
first, second, third, fourth, and sixth categories.  Their relevance
is evident in terms of commercial potential.  These categories
may contain the broadest array of T&A merchandise.  By defini-
tion, the fifth category is limited not just to sweaters, but specifi-
cally to sweaters consisting of a certain weight of cashmere, or of
a certain weight and diameter of wool.  By definition, the sev-
enth category is restricted to handicraft type articles.  In con-
trast, the first, second, third, fourth, and sixth categories may
contain articles as diverse as sleepwear for babies and neckties
for men.  Yet, it is in the categories of greatest potential commer-
cial significance where the rules of origin are tightest.195
A. The First Preference Category:  United States Yarn-Forward with
Beneficiary Assembly196
Essentially, this category is for apparel articles sewn together
in a T&A Beneficiary SSAC using American fabric, which is from
American yarn.197  Specifically, to qualify for duty-free treatment
195. At the same time, it is important not to underestimate the role of culture in
the economic and political development of Africa, and hence the potential contribu-
tion of cultural industries. See, e.g., CULTURE IN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:  INVESTING
IN CULTURAL AND NATURAL ENDOWMENTS (Ismail Serageldin & Joan Martin-Brown eds.,
1999) (containing proceedings from a 1998 conference sponsored by the World Bank
and United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”));
CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (Ismael Serageldin & June Taboroff eds., 1994)
(containing proceedings from a 1992 conference held at the World Bank).
196. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(1); see also HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98-II-3, U.S. R
note 7(a); U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 49-50 (identifying R
category 1); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 94 (first category of T&A articles). R
197. The idea of giving a preference to apparel assembled overseas from compo-
nents cut in the United States is not new.  Since roughly 1969, the United States has
offered reduced or duty-free treatment for such apparel under its “807 Program.”  The
name comes from Item 9802.00.80 in the HTSUS, which is the relevant provision stat-
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under this category, an article must meet five requirements:
(1) The article must be sewn (or otherwise assembled)
wholly in a T&A Beneficiary (or in multiple such Bene-
ficiaries).
(2) The article must be made from fabric (cloth) wholly
formed in the United States (or, if knit, must be from
components knit-to-shape in the United States).  The
article could be made from both fabric and knit-to-
shape components.
(3) The article must be wholly cut in the United States (or,
if knit, the components knit-to-shape in the United
States).
(4) The fabric itself must be from yarns wholly formed in
the United States (or, if knit, the components must be
from yarns wholly formed in the United States).
(5) Upon entry, the apparel must be classified in either one
of two categories in the HTSUS.
The first category is subheading 9802.00.80.  This subhead-
ing appears in Chapter 98, which consists of special classifica-
tions for articles exported and returned, having been advanced
or improved abroad.198  Items covered by this Chapter may enter
the United States duty-free, or partially duty-free, under certain
circumstances.  These circumstances include re-importation of
an article that was exported from the United States (without im-
provement in the condition of the article), articles subject to a
personal exemption brought back to the United States by a citi-
zen or permanent resident who traveled overseas, government
importations, goods used for religious, educational, or scientific
institutions, samples, and articles admitted under bond.199  As
for subheading 9802.00.80, it covers articles exported from and
returned to the United States, having been advanced or im-
proved abroad.200  The second category is Chapter 61, which
ing that a tariff is owed only on the value added from the foreign assembly process.  In
an earlier HTSUS, the number of the provision was 807.  Obviously, the 807 Program is
designed to encourage apparel producers located overseas to use American inputs.
While most countries are legally eligible for 807 treatment, many cannot make use of
the benefit, because of the practical problem that transportation costs erode savings on
tariffs. See Lamar, supra note 19, at 607-09 n.23. R
198. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 6. R
199. See id. at 6-7.
200. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(1)(A).  The HTSUS description states that this sub-
heading consists of:
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covers “Articles of Apparel and Clothing Accessories, Knitted or
Crocheted,” and Chapter 62, which covers “Articles of Apparel
and Clothing Accessories, Not Knitted or Crocheted.”201  The
second category applies only to apparel that would have been
classified in the first category, but for the fact they were embroi-
dered, or subjected to a particular process.  The processes in-
clude acid washing, enzyme washing, or stone washing, perma-
pressing, oven baking, bleaching, garment dyeing, and screen
printing.202
This category also includes apparel articles made from
fabrics that are not from yarns, as long as the fabrics are wholly
formed and cut in the United States, and the fabrics are classi-
fied under heading 5602 or 5603 of the HTSUS.  Chapter 56 of
the HTSUS deals with T&A articles from “wadding,” “felt,” “non-
wovens,” and “special yarns.”203  Heading 5602 contains “felt arti-
cles,” regardless of “whether or not [they are] impregnated,
coated, covered, or laminated”.204  Heading 5603 consists of
non-woven articles, regardless of “whether or not [they are] im-
Articles . . . assembled abroad in whole or in part of fabricated components,
the product of the United States, which (a) were exported in condition ready
for assembly without further fabrication, (b) have not lost their physical iden-
tity in such articles by change in form, shape, or otherwise, and (c) have not
been advanced in value or improved in condition abroad except by being as-
sembled and except by operations incidental to the assembly process such as
cleaning, lubricating and painting . . . .
HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98-II-6, subheading 9802.00.80.  However, the description also R
states that the subheading excludes T&A articles assembled in Mexico (as they are en-
tered under a different subheading, namely, 9802.00.90), articles entered under Sub-
chapter XIX of Chapter 98 (which covers T&A articles eligible for AGOA preferences),
and articles entered under Subchapter XX (which covers goods eligible for special
treatment under the United States—Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
(“CBPTA”)).  In brief, T&A articles are classifiable under subheading 9802.00.80 if they
have been assembled abroad from American components.  Normally, the duty on such
articles would be imposed on the full value of the article, less the cost of the American
components.  For articles eligible under AGOA, no duty is imposed. See id. (column
titled “Rates of Duty”); see also id. at 98-III-1, U.S. note 4.
201. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(1)(A); see also HTSUS, supra note 44, at 61-1, 62-2. R
In effect, Chapter 61 covers only knitted or crocheted articles, and Chapter 62 covers all
articles made of any textile fabric (other than wadding), other than articles that are
knitted or crocheted.
202. See HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98-XIX-4, subheading 9819.11.03 (concerning R
these articles).
203. See id. at 56-1.  Chapter 256 also covers T&A articles made of twine, cordage,
or ropes and cables.
204. See id. at 56-3, heading 5602.
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pregnated, coated, covered, or laminated”).205
An understandable immediate reaction to this category is to
ask why the United States insists on a T&A Beneficiary SSAC us-
ing American fabric that itself is made of American yarn?  One
answer is some Beneficiaries do not have the spinning and weav-
ing capacity to produce enough fabric to supply their domestic
apparel industry.  This scenario is true, for instance, in Ban-
gladesh (where T&A exports accounted in 2001 for 85.8% of
merchandise exports, the highest figure in the world).206  How-
ever, even if the same supply constraint exists in a Beneficiary
SSAC, it does not follow that AGOA must mandate use of Ameri-
can fabric and yarn.  Indeed, as Oxfam International points out:
Rich countries try to justify these heavy requirements [prefer-
ential rules of origin for T&A] by saying that they encourage
poor countries to develop textile production to supply their
clothing sector.  However, historical experience and contem-
porary production patterns undermine this argument.  No
small, poor country with a significant clothing industry has
ever succeeded in developing a matching supply-capacity in
textiles.207
Why not, then, let apparel producers in the Beneficiary choose
input sources based on market considerations like price and
quality?  This query leads to deeper economic and social justice
concerns (discussed later) about the rules of origin.
B. The Second Preference Category:  United States Yarn-Forward with
Beneficiary Cutting and Sewing Forward Using
American Thread 208
Essentially, this category is for apparel articles cut in a T&A
Beneficiary SSAC from American-made fabric.  The fabric must
be made of American yarn, and then sewn together in the Bene-
ficiary with American thread.  Specifically, to qualify for duty-free
treatment under this category, an article must satisfy five require-
ments.
205. See id. at 56-4, heading 5603.
206. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 19, 33 tbl.A1. R
207. Id. at 19.
208. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(2) (2005); see also HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98-XIX- R
4, subheading 9819.11.06 (concerning these articles); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES
COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 50; U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 94 (listing the R
second category of T&A articles).
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(1) The article must be sewn (or otherwise assembled) entirely
in a T&A Beneficiary SSAC (or in multiple such Benefi-
ciaries).
(2) The article must be made from fabric (cloth) wholly formed
in the United States (or, if knit, must be from components
knit-to-shape in the United States).  (The article could be
made from both fabric and knit-to-shape components.)
(3) The fabric itself must be from yarns wholly formed in the
United States (or, if knit, the components must be from
yarns wholly formed in the United States).
(4) The fabric must be cut in the T&A Beneficiary SSAC (or in
multiple such Beneficiaries).
(5) After cutting, the article must be sewn (or otherwise assem-
bled) using sewing thread from the United States.
The second preference category also includes apparel arti-
cles made from fabrics that are not from yarns, as long as the
fabrics are wholly formed (but not cut) in the United States, and
the fabrics are classified under heading 5602 or 5603 of the HT-
SUS (explained above).
The first three requirements are the same as in the first
preference category.  The latter two requirements, however, dis-
tinguish the categories.  In brief, the second preference category
is a cutting forward rule, whereas the first category is an assembly
(sewing) forward rule.
In both categories, American fabric made of American yarn
must be imported into a T&A Beneficiary SSAC.  In the first
preference category, the items imported already are cut in the
United States.  They can be sewn with or without American
thread, but this flexibility comes at a cost—they must satisfy par-
ticular HTSUS classifications.  In the second preference cate-
gory, fabric is imported, and cutting goes on in the T&A Benefi-
ciary SSAC.  That is advantageous to the Beneficiary, as more is
required than sewing.  When it comes time to sew the cut fabric
pieces, however, the thread must be American.  The trade-off for
using American thread is no HTSUS classification is mandated
for the finished article.
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C. The Third Preference Category:  Regional or Other Fabric209
The first two preference categories mandate use of Ameri-
can fabric, which in turn is made of American yarn.  The third
category affords flexibility on the origin of the fabric and yarn,
essentially providing duty-free treatment for apparel articles
from regional fabric and yarn, but subject to quantitative limits,
and only for a limited period.  In particular, to qualify, an ap-
parel article must satisfy three requirements:
(1) The article must be assembled wholly in a T&A Beneficiary
SSAC (or multiple such Beneficiaries).
(2) The article must be made of fabric (cloth) wholly formed in
a T&A Beneficiary SSAC (or multiple such Beneficiaries).  The
T&A Beneficiary in which assembly occurs need not be the same
one as the Beneficiary in which fabric is made.
(3) The fabric (cloth) must be from yarn originating either in
the United States or a T&A Beneficiary SSAC (or multiple such
Beneficiaries, or a former Beneficiary, i.e., one that is party to an
FTA with the United States).  If the fabric originates in a T&A
Beneficiary, then it need not be the same Beneficiary as the one
in which the yarn originates.
This preference category is sometimes called “Apparel as-
sembled from regional and other fabric.”210  A more accurate
rubric would be “United States Yarn-Forward or Beneficiary
Yarn-Forward with Beneficiary Fabric-Forward.”  By using the
words “regional” and “other fabric,” this appellation obfuscates
the requirement that not all other fabric qualifies.
“Regional” refers only to fabric from yarn spun in a T&A
Beneficiary SSAC, and “other” is restricted to fabric from Ameri-
can yarn.  For example, men’s dress shirts assembled in Kenya
from cotton cloth derived from cotton yarn spun either in the
same or another Beneficiary, or in the United States, would qual-
ify.  The shirts would not qualify if the cotton cloth came from
Egypt or Pakistan, or if the cloth came from a Beneficiary or the
United States, but the yarn came from Egypt or Pakistan.
Significantly, duty-free treatment of articles in this category
209. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(3); see also HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98-XIX-4, R
subheading 9819.11.09 (concerning these articles); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES
COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 50 (describing category 2); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra R
note 29, at 94 (identifying category 3). R
210. U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 94. R
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is subject to an annual quota.  In effect, this category is a tariff-
rate quota (“TRQ”), which subjects over-quota shipments to the
MFN rate.  Under the initial AGOA legislation, the period of ap-
plication was eight years, from 2000 to 2008.  Each year of opera-
tion started on October 1, when AGOA entered into force, and
ended on September 30.  Thus, the first year of operation was
October 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001, and the final year was
scheduled to be October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008.211
As Table 2 (below) shows, initially, the quota, or “cap,”
started at 1.5% of all apparel merchandise imported into the
United States.212  Under AGOA, the cap could grow by a total of
two percentage points, up to a maximum of 3.5%, over the sub-
sequent seven years.  The growth occurred in equal annual in-
crements, but in a way that for the final one-year period (Octo-
ber 1, 2007 through September 30, 2008), the cap could not ex-
ceed 3.5%.213  Thus, in the final year, the ceiling of 3.5% was
reached, and no growth occurred.  In the preceding seven years,
the cap grew by 0.286 percentage points each year (the differ-
ence between 3.5% and 1.5%, divided equally across seven peri-
ods).
To what is the cap—the specific percent figure for a particu-
lar year—applied?  The answer is “square meter equivalents”
(“SMEs”), a denomination that allows for comparison among
different kinds of apparel articles, as diverse, for example, as
wool sweaters and nylon tights.  Thus, for instance, the initial
cap, for the twelve months commencing October 1, 2000, was
246,500,393 SMEs.214  In that year, no more than this amount of
apparel from T&A Beneficiary SSACs could obtain preferential
treatment in the form of a zero tariff.
Because of AGOA III, the initial AGOA legislation did not
run its full course through September 30, 2008.  Rather, AGOA
III cut off the initial scheme on September 30, 2003, and estab-
lished a new period through September 30, 2015.  That is, under
AGOA III, the preference period was reset to start on October 1,
211. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 382-83 (reprinting R
the original AGOA statute with AGOA II amendments).
212. See id. at 51 (identifying item 5); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 95. R
213. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 383 (reprinting the R
original AGOA statute with AGOA II amendments); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, R
at 95.
214. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 95. R
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 67 24-FEB-06 13:27
2006] THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GENEROSITY 365
2003 and extended for eleven subsequent one year periods, the
last one being October 1, 2014 until September 30, 2015.215
Likewise, AGOA III reset the base cap to 4.747% in the ini-
tial year (October 1, 2003 through September 30, 2004), in ef-
fect raising it from the 3.5% ceiling that would have been
reached in the last year of operation of the original AGOA legis-
lation.216  Under AGOA III, the annual quantitative limit on ap-
parel produced in a SSA T&A Beneficiary from regional fabric
doubled, and the preferential period also doubled, from the ear-
lier ceiling of 3.5% to a higher ceiling of 7%.217  At first glance,
the AGOA III changes look generous toward the Beneficiaries.
Closer inspection, however, is revealing.
Specifically, for the one-year period beginning on October
1, 2003 (ending September 30, 2004), the cap was 4.747% of the
aggregate SMEs of all apparel imported into the United States in
the preceding twelve-month period.218  In effect, duty-free treat-
ment was offered to just under five percent of all apparel im-
ports.  This cap was allowed to grow in equal annual increments
for the subsequent five years.219  These increments were 0.563
percentage points (the difference between the 7% ceiling and
the 4.747% base, divided into four equal amounts so as to reach
7% in the fifth year).  By the fifth year (October 1, 2007 through
September 30, 2008), however, the cap could not exceed seven
percent.220  Thereafter, until the final year, October 1, 2014
through September 30, 2015, the cap must remain at seven per-
cent.221
Thus, under AGOA III in comparison with the original
215. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(3)(A)(i), (b)(3)(A)(ii)(II) (2005).
216. Under AGOA II, the cap rose from 1.5% to 3% in the year beginning October
1, 2000, and from 3.5% to 7% in the year beginning October 1, 2007, but also ensured
that the cap was for the benefit of apparel made from regional or American fabric and
yarn, not third country fabric. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at R
52.
217. See id. at 45.
218. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(3)(A)(ii)(I); see also HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98- R
XIX-1, U.S. note 2(b).  The statutory language refers to the extension of preferential
treatment to imported apparel articles in an amount that do not exceed the “applicable
percentage” of the aggregate SME “of all apparel articles imported into the United
States in the preceding 12-month period for which data are available.” 19 U.S.C.S.
§ 3721(b)(3)(A)(i).
219. See id. § 3721(b)(3)(A)(ii)(I).
220. See id.
221. See id. § 3721(b)(3)(A)(ii)(II).
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 68 24-FEB-06 13:27
366 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:299
AGOA legislation, the cap is double from the 3.5% limit, and the
preference period essentially doubled from 2008 to 2015.  Are
these changes indicative of American generosity toward Benefi-
ciaries?  The answer depends on the historical counterfactual
scenario used as a benchmark.  If the counterfactual is a shorter
period with a 3.5% cap, then the answer is obvious—Benefi-
ciaries are better off with AGOA III—because of the longer pe-
riod and the seven percent cap—than they would have been
with just the original AGOA legislation.
Consider a slightly different counterfactual scenario.  Sup-
pose the original AGOA rules applied for the AGOA III period,
i.e., the initial regime extended until the 2014-2015.  The 3.5%
ceiling still would be reached in the 2007-2008 year, and would
not increase.  The only benefit would be that the period of pref-
erence would continue until 2014-2015.  The ceiling of 3.5% ver-
sus 7% easily would offset that benefit, meaning AGOA III con-
fers greater generosity than this alternative.
But, suppose both the period had been extended and the
cap allowed to grow.  Would T&A Beneficiary SSACs have been
better off?  The answer depends on the number of percentage
points by which the cap increased each year.  The most realistic
assumption is to apply the same increments as existed under
AGOA (0.286 percentage points) or AGOA III (0.563 percent-
age points).  The answer also depends on the year in which the
increments presumably commence.  The most realistic assump-
tion is to track AGOA III, and increase the cap subsequent to the
year October 1, 2003 through September 30, 2004, i.e., 2004-
2005.  Finally, the answer depends on whether a ceiling cap is
imposed.  It is unrealistic to assume there would be no ceiling, as
both AGOA and AGOA III contained 3.5% and 7% limits, re-
spectively.  The assumption most favorable to the United States,
however, in terms of highlighting its potential generosity, is to
assume no ceilings on caps.
With these assumptions, consider three distinct possibilities,
all shown below, in Table 2.  Scenario Number 1 is “AGOA
Growth.”  Under the original AGOA legislation, that amount was
0.286%, i.e., the cap in any year until the final year, equaled the
cap in the previous year plus 0.286 percentage points.  The re-
sult would be a final cap of 6.360%.  (This result assumes no
“step up” from 3.5% to 4.747% in the year beginning October 1,
2003.)  In this counterfactual scenario—extending the prefer-
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ence period and continuing growth at the original pace—the fi-
nal cap is below the seven percent ceiling of AGOA III.  Put di-
rectly, AGOA III is more generous than this counterfactual sce-
nario, but not by much—not even one percent.222
Consider Scenario Number 2, “AGOA Growth Plus Step
Up.”  In this counterfactual situation, there is an extended pe-
riod, and an assumed “step up” from 3.5% to 4.747% in the year
beginning October 1, 2003.  This assumption is reasonable, be-
cause it occurred under AGOA III.  If the growth in the cap,
starting from the 4.747% base were 0.286 percentage points, i.e.,
the original AGOA increase amount, then what would the final
cap be?  The answer is 7.607%.  That is a larger cap than the
actual cap of seven percent under AGOA III, but only by about
one-half of one percent.223
As a final counterfactual scenario, Scenario Number 3 is
AGOA III “Growth Plus Step Up.”  Here, the supposition is an
extended period, a “step up” from 3.5 to 4.747% in 2003, and
growth increments of 0.563 percentage points.  Under AGOA
III, this step up occurred, and these increments are applied.
Hence, Scenario Number 3 is not unrealistic.  The final cap
would be 10.378%.  This figure is considerably higher than the
seven percent ceiling actually existing under AGOA III.  If this
scenario is the counterfactual by which to judge AGOA III, then
the United States cannot be said to have been generous in its
legislation.  To the contrary, AGOA III looks like a trick de-
signed to cut back on the generosity it otherwise might have of-
fered.224
The “bottom line” is the third preference category and is
not as generous as it first appears.  It promises flexibility to T&A
Beneficiary SSACs by allowing them to use fabric made of yarn
from either the United States or a Beneficiary.  But, it imposes
serious limits on the volume of apparel made from such fabric,
in the form of a TRQ with caps allowed to grow modestly to low
222. If the period in which increments of 0.286 percentage points are added to the
base cap of 4.747% is the year subsequent to October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008, i.e.,
2008-2009, then the final cap is 5.216%.
223. If the period in which increments of 0.286 percentage points are added to the
base cap of 4.747% is the year subsequent to October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008, i.e.,
2008-2009, then the final cap is 6.463%.
224. If the period in which increments of 0.563 percentage points are added to the
base cap of 4.747% is the year subsequent to October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008, i.e.,
2008-2009, then the final cap is 8.126%.
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TABLE 2:  Cap on Duty-Free Treatment for Regional or Other Fabric
Preference Category
Actual Cap Scenario #2: Scenario #3:
Actual Cap on Duty Free AGOA AGOA III
on Duty Free Treatment Growth Plus Growth Plus
Treatment Under AGOA Scenario #1: Step Up Step Up
Under AGOA III Annual In- AGOA (Cap assuming (Cap assuming
(applied to (applied to crement to Growth AGOA Incre- AGOA Incre-
Preference SMEs of all SMEs of all Actual Cap (Cap assuming ment of 0.286 ment of 0.563
Year apparel im- apparel im- (percentage AGOA Incre- percentage percentage
(from October ports into U.S. ports into U.S. points added ment of 0.286 points and points and
1, through in last twelve in last twelve to cap from percentage AGOA III step AGOA III step
September 30) months) months) previous year) points) up to 4.747) up to 4.747)
2000-2001 1.5% — 0.286 — — —
2001–2002 1.786% — 0.286 — — —
2002–2003 2.072% — 0.286 — — —
















2007–2008 3.5% 6.999%, 0 4.644% 5.891% 6.999%,
i.e., 7% (AGOA and i.e., 7%
AGOA III
ceiling hit)
2008–2009 — 7% 0 4.930% 6.177% 7.563%
(AGOA III
ceiling hit)
2009–2010 — 7% 0 5.216% 6.463% 8.126%
(AGOA III
ceiling hit)
2010–2011 — 7% 0 5.502% 6.749% 8.689%
(AGOA III
ceiling hit)
2011–2012 — 7% 0 5.788% 7.035% 9.252%
(AGOA III
ceiling hit)
2012–2013 — 7% 0 6.074% 7.321% 9.815%
(ceiling hit)
2014–2015 — 7% 0 6.360% 7.607% 10.378%
(ceiling hit)
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ceiling levels.  Lest there be any doubt about this verdict, con-
sider the fact that a special safeguard remedy applies to this cate-
gory.
In particular, if imports from Beneficiaries surge, then the
United States can remove duty-free treatment.225  The Secretary
of Commerce is authorized to determine whether “there has
been a surge in imports of an article [qualifying under the re-
gional fabric preference category] . . . from a” Beneficiary
SSAC.226  Specifically, the Secretary must decide whether the ar-
ticle “is being imported in such increased quantities as to cause
serious damage, or threat thereof, to the domestic industry pro-
ducing a like or directly competitive article.”227  The list of fac-
tors the Secretary considers in making an injury determination is
open-ended, and includes any economic variable with an effect
on imports, such as capacity utilization, domestic production,
employment, exports, inventories, investment, market share,
prices, profits, and sales.228  If the answer is affirmative, then the
President must suspend duty-free treatment.229  Any “interested
party” can request a ruling from the Secretary.230  The definition
of this term includes not only producers (including workers, un-
ions, and worker groups, as well as trade or business associa-
tions) of a like or directly competitive product, but also anyone
(producers, workers, unions, and worker groups, and trade or
business associations) “engaged in the manufacture, production,
or sale of essential inputs for the like or directly competitive arti-
cle.”231  In other words, the universe of potential claimants with
standing to bring a surge mechanism case includes most of the
commercial chain, upstream and downstream.
The surge mechanism might be dubbed (diplomatically)
“noteworthy.”  It is a weapon against exports containing regional
fabric, yet the weapon targets the apparel sectors of desperately
poor countries.  The legal aspects of this weapon make it all the
more “noteworthy.”  That is evident by contrasting this mecha-
nism with the legal criteria for an escape clause action under
225. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 52-53. R
226. 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(3)(C)(ii).
227. Id.
228. See id. § 3721(b)(3)(C)(iii).
229. See id. § 3721(b)(3)(C)(ii).
230. See id.
231. Id. § 3721(b)(3)(C)(v).
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section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974.232  These criteria accord
(though not completely) with the general safeguard remedy in
Article XIX of GATT.233  The contrast shows the criteria associ-
ated with an AGOA surge mechanism are less rigorous than the
requirements for an escape clause action, meaning it appears
comparatively easier to get relief against African apparel.
To invoke the escape clause, increased imports must be “a
substantial cause of serious injury, or the threat thereof, to the
domestic industry producing an article like or directly competi-
tive with the imported article.”234  The investigation is conducted
not by one executive branch official, but rather by an indepen-
dent agency—the ITC.235  An affirmative determination results
in a recommendation to the President for relief, but the Presi-
dent may choose not to raise trade barriers, because such action
is “appropriate and feasible.”236  As indicated, the causation test
in the surge mechanism is unmodified, i.e., it does not have the
descriptive adjective “substantial.”  Any causal contribution is
enough to justify relief.  In contrast to a section 201 case, in a
surge mechanism case, it is not necessary to show there is no
cause more important than the imports from a Beneficiary.
Also in contrast to a section 201 case, in a surge mechanism
case, one member of the President’s cabinet makes the decision.
The President has no choice but to suspend duty-free treatment
if the decision is positive.  Finally, the universe of potential peti-
tioners in a section 201 case does not expressly include upstream
producers, workers, or associations.  Rather, the petitioner must
be “an entity, including a trade association, firm, certified or or-
ganized union, or group of workers, which is representative of
an industry.”237  In turn, the industry must be the one subject to
actual or threatened serious injury.238
232. See id. §§ 2251-2254 (2005).
233. See BHALA, supra note 108, at 953; see generally id. at 939-998. R
234. § 2251(a).
235. See id. §§ 2251(a), 2252.
236. Id. §§ 2253(a)(1)(A), 2251(a), 2252(e).
237. Id. § 2252(a).
238. See id. § 2251(a).
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D. The Fourth Preference Category:  Third Country Fabric239
One dimension of the regional fabric category is, in effect, a
separate rule of origin category.  There is a special rule for a
T&A Beneficiary SSAC designated as “lesser developed,” some-
times called the “Third Country Fabric Provision.”240  The basic
rule for qualifying as “lesser developed” is a per capita GNP of
less than US$1500 (as of 1998, measured by the World Bank).241
However, AGOA identifies three countries by name as “lesser de-
veloped”—Botswana, Namibia, and Mauritius—that have higher
per capita incomes.242  Indeed, the per capita income of Mauri-
tius, around US$10,000, is considerably higher, and that country
sometimes is cited as a success story.243
The special rule is an apparel article wholly assembled (or
knit-to-shape) in a lesser developed Beneficiary (or multiple
such Beneficiaries) may qualify for duty-free treatment, regard-
less of the country or origin of the fabric or yarn used to make
the articles.  In effect, the lesser developed Beneficiary can
source inputs from anywhere in the world.  However, this special
rule is subject to two limitations.
First, the special rule applies only through September 30,
2007, which is just half the length of extension of other AGOA
benefits.244  Second, there is a cap, which is defined in terms of
an “applicable percentage” of SMEs of all apparel articles im-
ported into the United States in the previous twelve-month pe-
riod for which data are available.245  The cap rises, then falls.246
In the first year (October 1, 2003 through September 30, 2004),
the applicable percentage was 2.3571%.  In the second year,
(October 1, 2004 through September 30, 2005), it was 2.6428%.
In the third year (October 1, 2005 through September 30,
239. See id. § 3721(b)(3)(B) (2005); see also HTSUS, supra note 44, at 98-XIX-4, R
subheading 9819.11.12 (concerning these articles).
240. See, e.g., OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 22). R
241. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
242. See id. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(iii)(II)-(III), (b)(3)(B)(iv); see also U.S. TRADE STAT-
UTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 51. R
243. See, e.g., MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 198 (2004) (explaining
how Mauritius moved up the value added chain from sugar plantations to textile and
apparel production to labor-intensive manufacturing).
244. See 19 U.S.C. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(i).  Initially, the sunset date was September 30,
2004. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 91. R
245. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(ii).
246. See id. § 3721(b)(3)(B)(ii)(I)-(IV).
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2006), it peaked at 2.9285%.  In the final year (October 1, 2006
through September 30, 2007), the cap drops to just 1.6071%.
E. The Fifth Preference Category:  Beneficiary Knit to Shape-Forward
for Certain Sweaters247
Certain kinds of sweaters potentially qualify for duty-free
treatment.  To qualify, the sweaters must satisfy two require-
ments: (1) The sweaters are knit-to-shape in a T&A Beneficiary
SSAC; (2) The sweaters are made either of cashmere or fine me-
rino wool.
If the sweaters are cashmere, then their chief weight must
consist of cashmere.  They also must be classified under sub-
heading 6110.10 of the HTSUS, which covers sweaters, pullovers,
sweatshirts, waistcoats (i.e., vests), and other similar articles that
are knitted or crocheted.248  If the sweaters are wool, then they
must contain fifty percent or more merino wool, and the diame-
ter of that wool must be no finer (i.e., not exceed) 21.5 mi-
crons.249  As indicated earlier, this preference category is narrow
and unlikely to be of great commercial significance.
F. The Sixth Preference Category:  Short Supply and NAFTA Parity250
Are there any circumstances in which the United States will
accord duty-free treatment to apparel from a T&A Beneficiary
SSAC, which is not a lesser developed country, even though the
fabric, or the yarn making up the fabric, is neither American nor
from a Beneficiary?  Asked succinctly, can apparel made of third
country fabric or yarn qualify?  The answer is “yes, under the
247. See id. § 3721(b)(4); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, R
at 50 (describing category 3); HTSUS, supra note 44, at 91-XIX-5, sub-headings R
9819.11.15, 9819.11.18 (concerning these articles); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, R
at 95 (describing category 4).
248. The statutory reference to HTSUS item 6110.10 does not correspond to an
actual sub-heading in the HTSUS.  In the HTSUS, heading 6110 is as described above.
The next item listed is sub-heading 6110.11.00, which covers sweaters, pullovers, etc.,
made of wool or fine animal hair. See HTSUS, supra note 44, at 61-43. R
249. See U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, at 51 (concerning the R
correction by AGOA II of an earlier drafting problem about yarn diameter).
250. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(5); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra
note 29, at 50 (describing category 4); HTSUS, supra note 44, at 91-XIX-5, sub-headings R
9819.11.21, 9819.11.24 (concerning these articles); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, R
at 95 (describing category 5).
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sixth preference category, the origin or fabric or yarn is irrele-
vant.”
The usual rubric for this category is the “Third Country
Fabric” provision.  A full (but cumbersome) title for this cate-
gory might be “Beneficiary Cutting and Sewing Forward with a
NAFTA Rule of Origin or with Short-Supply Fabric or Yarn.”
That is because to qualify, the apparel must be cut (or knit to
shape), sewn, and further assembled in a Beneficiary.  But, duty-
free treatment depends on satisfaction of a short-supply test, plus
the applicable NAFTA rule of origin.251
The short-supply test is that the fabric, or the yarn used in
the fabric, is “not available in commercial quantities in the
United States.”252  The exact NAFTA rule of origin depends on
the customs classification of the apparel article.  They are (for
the most part) change-in-tariff-heading (“CTH”) rules, also
known as “tariff shift” rules.253  In theory, at least, this kind of
rule of origin determines whether a sufficient amount of eco-
nomic activity occurred in a country to justify conferral of origin
in that country.  As a general proposition, the greater the shift
(e.g., at the four digit HTSUS classification level), the greater
the economic activity in a country.  Conversely, the smaller the
shift (e.g., at the eight digit level), the more modest the activity.
To apply a CTH rule, two sets of records must be available
to answer two questions.  First, what HTSUS classification ap-
plied to the imported components before they were manufac-
tured into a finished apparel article?  Second, what HTSUS clas-
sification applied to the finished apparel article?  The first ques-
tion concerns customs classification by a Beneficiary (i.e., when
the materials imported were imported into the Beneficiary).
The second question concerns classification upon entry of the
finished article into the United States.  Of course, applying the
251. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(5)(A), 3721(e)(3).  Note that entry may occur
under two HTSUS sub-headings. See HTSUS, supra note 44, at 91-XIX-5, sub-heading R
9819.11.21 (mentioning General Note 12 to the HTSUS, which concerns NAFTA); id.
at sub-heading 9819.11.24 (concerning short supply).  Generally, NAFTA sets out a
yarn-forward rule of origin for garments to obtain duty-free, quota-free treatment. See
Lamar, supra note 19, at 607 n.25. R
252. 19 U.S.C. § 3721(b)(5)(A).  Note the phrase “such fabrics or yarns” in sub-
paragraph (5)(A), which refers to the language in paragraph (5) concerning “fabric or
yarn not available in commercial quantities in the United States.” See id.
253. See NAFTA, supra note 68, Annex 401; see also HTSUS, supra note 44, GN-31, R
general note 12(b)(ii)(A).
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rule also presumes an exporter in a T&A Beneficiary SSAC has
access directly, or through counsel, to NAFTA.  Annex 401 of
NAFTA contains the rules of origin (including for Chapters 50
to 63 of the HTSUS, which cover T&A merchandise), and they
are reproduced in the General Notes to the HTSUS.254  While
this may be true for prominent, well-connected exporters, it is
difficult to imagine either NAFTA or the HTSUS is a bestseller
anywhere on the African continent.  Put simply, aside from the
complexity of the CTH rules, access to them is difficult, and both
problems raise the cost of compliance with AGOA to qualify for
duty-free treatment.
No less significant a concern is the oddity of AGOA incorpo-
rating by reference the Annex 401 origin rules.  True, it may be
preferable to creating a whole new set of origin rules.  But, why
give the relatively poorer countries of SSA the same treatment as
Mexican apparel exporters?  The origin requirement creates a
kind of legal parity among two patently unequal categories of
exporters whenever fabric or yarn is neither American nor Afri-
can, subjecting the poorer ones to the same origin strictures as
the comparatively better-off ones.  Evidently, the scale of relative
deprivation plays no role in the fifth preference category.
Implicit in the short-supply test outlined above is perma-
nence, i.e., that the fabric or yarn in question is unavailable in
commercial quantities in the United States now and in the long
run.  Silk might be one example of such a fabric.  However, what
if the fabric or yarn is available, but not immediately, nor in the
short or medium term?  In that instance, if an “interested party”
requests, the President may proclaim duty-free treatment for
yarns or fabrics that “cannot be supplied by the domestic indus-
try in commercial quantities in a timely manner.”255
To qualify, such apparel must come from fabric or yarn not
available in commercial quantities in the United States (the first
prong), and that American producers cannot supply in commer-
254. See NAFTA, supra note 68, Annex 401; see also HTSUS, supra note 44, at GN-40 R
to -41, general note 12(r).
255. 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(5)(B)(i) (emphasis added).  Before making this proc-
lamation, the President must obtain advice from an appropriate advisory committee,
and the International Trade Commission (“ITC”), submit a report to the House Ways
and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee, and adhere to certain time
frames. See id. § 3721(b)(5)(B)(ii)-(v).  The advisory committee to which AGOA refers
is established under section 135 of the Trade Act of 1974. See id. § 2155 (2005).
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 77 24-FEB-06 13:27
2006] THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GENEROSITY 375
cial quantities in a timely manner (the second prong).  In brief,
the apparel qualifies, despite consisting of non-American fabric
or yarn, if the inputs are in short supply in the United States.
The President makes the short-supply determination, though in
practice the President has delegated this authority to OTEXA at
the Department of Commerce.256  The criteria applied are that
the fabric or yarn in question “cannot be supplied by the domes-
tic [American] industry in commercial quantities in a timely
manner.”257
G. The Seventh Preference Category:  Cultural Textile and Apparel258
Certain T&A goods, specifically, ones that are hand-loomed,
handmade, or folklore articles, or ethnic printed fabrics, poten-
tially qualify for preferential treatment.  Conceptually, there are
three stages for qualification.  First, the prospective T&A Benefi-
ciary SSAC must consult with the United States as to the eligibil-
ity of the good.  Second, the United States must decide whether
the good indeed qualifies as a hand-loomed, handmade, or folk-
lore article, or an ethnic printed fabric.  Third, if the United
States renders an affirmative determination in the second step,
then a competent authority in the beneficiary country must cer-
tify the good as an eligible hand-loomed, hand-made, or folklore
article, or ethnic printed fabric.
This category poses virtually no competitive threat to any
American producer.  Almost by definition, African cultural T&A
articles do not have like or directly competitive products.  Put
simply, generosity through duty-free treatment in this category
hardly is self-giving.  The practical benefit from this generosity,
for exporters, depends on the value and volume of exports in
this category.  Once again, almost by definition, small, cottage-
industry-like producers, are among the likeliest of beneficiaries.
How significant they are in a national economy, and the role
they play in boosting growth, is dubious.  After all, few if any
countries reached developed country status through a handi-
crafts industry.
256. See Exec. Order No. 13,197, 66 Fed. Reg. 7271 (Jan. 22, 2001).
257. 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(5)(B)(i).
258. See id. § 3721(b)(6); see also U.S. TRADE STATUTES COMPILATION, supra note 29, R
at 50 (describing category 5); HTSUS, supra note 44, at 91-XIX-5, sub-heading R
9819.11.27 (concerning these articles); U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., supra note 31, at 95 R
(describing category 6).
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 78 24-FEB-06 13:27
376 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:299
H. The Eighth Preference Category:  Multi-Jurisdictional Apparel259
The eighth and final AGOA preference category covers ap-
parel assembled in a T&A Beneficiary SSAC from components
originating in both a Beneficiary and the United States.  Accord-
ingly, the category might be called “Beneficiary Assembly For-
ward with Beneficiary or American Components.”  In specific,
sewing may occur in a Beneficiary using American thread, where
the components stitched together come from, and are cut in,
the United States and a Beneficiary (or former Beneficiary)
SSAC.  The fabric must be American.  This fabric must consist of
American yarn (or components knit-to-shape in the United
States  and one or more Beneficiary or former Beneficiary, or
both).260
As an example, suppose the apparel article in question is a
100% cotton men’s dress shirt.  The pockets and sleeves are cut
in the United States, while the body is cut in one Beneficiary.  In
a second Beneficiary, with American thread, the pockets, sleeves,
and body, are stitched together (along with other components,
like collars and cuffs, that may come from any country).261  The
pockets, sleeves, and body are from cotton fabric made of cotton
spun in the United States.  The article would qualify for duty-free
treatment under this category.
This category gives a T&A Beneficiary SSAC a modicum of
flexibility in sourcing components.  It can choose from multiple
jurisdictions, without having to source all components from one
jurisdiction.  However, it is constrained to choose from the
United States, a fellow Beneficiary, or a domestic source.  The
insistence on American fabric made of American yarn is a famil-
iar stricture.  An essentially similar one exists in the first and sec-
ond preference category.  Thus, the flavor of all three categories
is—put colloquially—“you (the Beneficiary) can have duty-free
treatment, but only if you use our (American) fabric and yarn.”
VII. THREE PROBLEMS AGAIN
However long the night, the dawn will break.
259. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(7); HTSUS, supra note 44, at 91-XIX-5, sub-heading R
9819.11.30 (concerning these articles).
260. Fabric not from yarns qualifies, as long as such fabric is classified under head-
ings 5602 or 5603 of the HTSUS. See 19 U.S.C.S. § 3721(b)(7).
261. See id. § 3721(d)(3)(A).
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 79 24-FEB-06 13:27
2006] THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GENEROSITY 377
—African Proverb
A. Trade Distortion?
Apparel articles are among the classic examples of low-value
added manufactured items that development economists, such
as Walt Rostow (in The Stages of Economic Growth), identify as sig-
nificant to countries advancing to and beyond the “take off” for
industrialization.262  From the perspective of a poor country,
these products tend to be ones in which they have a keen export
interest, and thus ones in which the preferential rules of origin
matter greatly.  As Oxfam International observes, “[w]orld trade
has great potential to reduce poverty, and textiles and clothing,
the largest industrial sector of developing countries, can clearly
play a role in this.”263
Trade in T&A constitutes roughly eight percent of all trade
in manufactured goods.264  The leading example of “high de-
pendence” on T&A (defined as earning more than fifty percent
of export revenue from one sector) is Bangladesh, for which
T&A account for 85.8% of the merchandise export revenue.265
Rounding out the top five in terms of T&A as a percentage of
national merchandise exports are Macao (84.4%), Cambodia
(72.5%), Pakistan (72.1%), and El Salvador (60.2%).266  Exports
in this sector play a prominent role for at least one SSAC, Mauri-
tius:  56.6% (number six).267  They also play a significant role in
North African countries such as Tunisia (number ten, with
42.4%) and Morocco (number twelve at 34.9%), and Egypt
(number twenty-three with 12.8%).268  In India, twenty percent
of industrial production comes from T&A, and this sector em-
262. See W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 39 (2d ed., 1971).
263. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 30. R
264. See id. at 7.  For current statistics on T&A trade, see the WTO website, http://
www.wto.org (particularly Charts on Regional Shares in World Trade in Textiles).  Gen-
erally, Asia holds the largest regional share in this trade, with over forty percent of
world T&A exports coming from Asia, and with over twenty-five percent of world T&A
imports going to Asia.  Africa holds the smallest share, with less than a five percent
share in world exports and imports. See World Trade Organization, Background Statistical
Information with Respect to Trade in Textiles and Clothing, G/L/692 (Sept. 20, 2004).
265. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 33 tbl.A1 (showing data reported by the R
World Bank for 2001).
266. See id. at 33.
267. It is noteworthy that no T&A Beneficiary SSAC figures on the top twenty-five
list, except for Mauritius. See id.
268. See id. at 33.
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ploys fifteen million people.269  Further, there are multiplier ef-
fects from T&A production and exports.  Businesses develop
around this activity, from fruit and newsagents to haircutting
and pharmacies.  There also are significant externalities, includ-
ing the employment and potential empowerment (as well as ex-
ploitation) of women.270  With respect to apparel, seventy per-
cent of apparel exports come from developing countries.271
To pick up on the question of “why?,” why is it appropriate
to characterize the preferential rules of origin for these articles
as “devilish” from the vantage point of a prospective Beneficiary
SSAC?  This question is serious because surely the rules can be
defended on the ground many SSACs do not have the capacity
to weave, cut, or assemble fabric, and indeed do not even have
significant domestic yarn production.  In other words, inputs
into apparel articles are not readily available anyway, so what is
wrong with rules of origin requiring use of American inputs?272
One answer, in brief, is distortion.  This response arises out
of conventional neo-classical economic theory.  These rules cre-
ate an artificial distortion about sourcing inputs.  Consider the
reality of global T&A production as seen by Victor Fung, the
Chairman of Li & Fung, the major garment supplier in Hong
Kong to American and European clothing brands:
We might decide to buy yarn from a Korean producer but
have it woven and dyed in Taiwan.  So we pick the yarn and
ship it to Taiwan.  The Japanese have the best zippers and
buttons, but they manufacture them mostly in China.  Okay,
so we go to YKK, a big Japanese manufacturer, and we order
the right zippers from their Chinese plants.  Then we deter-
mine that . . . the best place to make the garments is Thai-
land.  So we ship everything there. . . . We’re not asking which
country can do the best job overall.  Instead, we’re pulling
269. See id. at 14.
270. See generally MICHAEL KEVANE, WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA:  HOW
GENDER WORKS (2004) (discussing gender differences concerning land and labor
rights, bargaining power, and household affairs, and linking these differences to poor
economic performance).
271. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 29. R
272. See Lamar, supra note 19, at 616-17 (noting the lack of inputs, and explaining R
that “[o]ne of the major elements in any sourcing strategy is determining if there are
sufficient quantities of fabric and other inputs for garment production . . . . [q]uality,
cost, and the unreliability of textile mill operations often disqualify local fabrics,” and
that while raw materials, like cotton and wool, are produced in many African countries,
as of the late 1990s, only Mauritius and South Africa had modern textile production).
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apart the value chain and optimizing each step—and we’re
doing it globally. . . . If you talk to the big global consumer-
products companies, they are all moving in this direction—
toward being best on a global scale.273
Yet, the AGOA preferential rules of origin seem either oblivious,
or to flout deliberately, this free market logic.274  It will not do to
criticize SSA for lacking globally-minded entrepreneurs like
Victor Fung, or to castigate African rulers for bad governance
and corruption, without also engaging in introspection.  What
technical American trade rules impede the likes of Victor Fung
in SSA?  In AGOA, the first and third preference categories are
not based on pure assembly rules.  Rather, they combine assem-
bly operations in an SSA T&A beneficiary with yarn-forward re-
quirements.  Likewise, the second preference category is not a
pure cutting-forward rule.  Rather, it contains a yarn-forward re-
quirement.  The eighth category suffers from the same problem.
These strictures discourage would-be African entrepreneurs
in a T&A SSAC Beneficiary from obtaining fabric from the
cheapest cost or highest quality sources, and creating an effi-
cient, vertically integrated, global production chain like that of
Li & Fung.  Rather, under the first and third categories, they
must pay attention to the country of origin of the yarn in the
fabric, not the price and quality of the yarn.  Under the second
category, they must focus on the source of the thread, not its
price and quality.  Under the eighth category, they most focus
on the source of fabric, yarn, and thread.  If the fabric, yarn, or
thread is not American, then any hope of duty-free, quota free
treatment from the United States is lost.  The economic fact that
substitute material from a third country, such as Egypt or Paki-
stan, may be cheaper or better quality than the American inputs,
is legally irrelevant.
One response to the trade distortion critique might be the
AGOA preferential rules of origin encourage regional develop-
ment.  Some of them allow for use of fabric or yarn from more
273. OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 20. R
274. A related concern for SSACs, and indeed many small T&A exporting coun-
tries, is the elimination as of December 31, 2004 of quota reservations pursuant to the
WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (“ATC”).  For an analysis of this problem,
see Viji Rangaswami, A Stitch in Time:  Helping Vulnerable Countries Meet the Challenges of
Apparel Quota Elimination, POL’Y OUTLOOK, Oct. 2005, available at http://www.
carnegieendowment.org/files/PO20.Rangaswami.FINAL.pdf.
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 82 24-FEB-06 13:27
380 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:299
than one Beneficiary.  The third and eighth preference catego-
ries are illustrations.  Such allowance is known as “regional cu-
mulation,” indicating a proportion of the inputs into a finished
garment may come from other countries in the region of the
beneficiary, yet not vitiate eligibility for preferential treatment.
Oxfam International dubs regional cumulation a “flawed trade
instrument,” stating “there is no development rationale for pro-
moting regional rather than global cumulation.”275  It adds:
The USA’s African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) . . .
contains imperfect rules on cumulation.  The Act stipulates
that apparel exported from African countries to the USA
must use either US or African fabrics to qualify for AGOA
benefits, notably discriminating against fabrics produced in Asia.
One recent study [by the World Bank] estimates that Mauri-
tius would have seen its total exports increase by 36 per cent
between 2001 and 2004 under AGOA, rather than 5 per cent,
had restrictive rules of origin not been in place.276
Whether the points Oxfam makes are true generally, or depend
on the industry and regional in question, is a matter best left to
development economists.
For now, four points should be emphasized.  First, not all
AGOA rules encourage regional development.  If they did, then
why are they—as Oxfam International puts it—“unreasonably
demanding”?277  Second, the rules are inconsistent, if not disin-
genuous, in promoting development in SSA.  They address de-
velopment in the American T&A industry as much as they do in
SSA, and arguably because of fears of competition from foreign
suppliers in Asia, there is no analog to AGOA for developing or
least-developed countries in Asia.278  Third, whether a rule of or-
igin is an appropriate tool to encourage regional development is
worthy of examination.  Surely there are more direct, efficient
legal instruments.  Fourth, and most fundamentally, there may
well be strong arguments against promoting regional versus
global development.
275. OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 21. R
276. Id. at 22 (emphasis added); see also A. MATTOO, D. ROY & A. SUBRAMANIAN,
THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT AND ITS RULES OF ORIGIN:  GENEROSITY
UNDERMINED? 4, 14 (World Bank Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper
No. 2908, 2002).
277. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 23. R
278. See id.
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B. Economic Dependency?
Applying dependency theory, the rules of origin tie a T&A
Beneficiary SSAC to the United States, or at least encourage that
outcome.  As Oxfam International observes, “agreements [like
AGOA and the European “Everything But Arms” program] that
are supposed to benefit poor countries actually serve to promote
the production of textiles in rich countries, to the detriment of
the developing world as a whole.”279  In the context of AGOA (as
intimated earlier), this tying is patent in all but the fifth and sev-
enth preference categories, and effected through hybrid speci-
fied process rules of origin.  Rather than, for example, a pure
assembly rule in the first and third preferential categories, or a
pure cutting forward rule in the second and eighth preferential
categories, there are added mandates about the American origin
of fabric, yarn, or thread.  Such mandates encourage a Benefici-
ary to become dependent on the United States for inputs.
This encouragement is ironic.  In the aftermath of the Sec-
ond World War, when the United States actively engaged in the
drafting of the GATT at the 1946 London Preparatory Confer-
ence and the 1947 Geneva Preparatory Conference, it argued
strongly against the preferential trading arrangements of the Eu-
ropean colonial powers.280  Tying peripheral countries in Africa,
Asia, and the Caribbean to the center countries like the United
Kingdom and France was incongruous with free trade and the
development interests of the poor countries.  The American ar-
gument was not entirely successful.  But, it did at least limit the
schemes to the parameters set forth in Article I(2) of GATT, a
restricted exception to the MFN obligation in Article I(1).281
Does AGOA bespeak an historic reversal of American efforts
to resist center–periphery type links?  Does it reveal a neo-colo-
nial tolerance (indeed, support) for vertical integration of the
T&A production through such links?  Why does AGOA confer
no meaningful reward for economic integration among poor
countries, for instance, where a Beneficiary SSAC seeks high-
quality, low-cost cotton from Egypt or Pakistan?  Is it too cynical
a response to say AGOA is about divide and rule?  These ques-
tions are not pleasant to pose, nor should an ideologically-driven
279. See id. at 20.
280. See BHALA, supra note 108, at 53; see generally id. at chs. 2-3. R
281. See id. at 76-77; see generally id. at chs. 2-3.
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answer be presumed.  But, AGOA is not pleasant reading for an
international trade lawyer or scholar who believes, perhaps mis-
takenly or foolishly, that international trade law can be about
more than politically-motivated protection, that it can be a policy
instrument to assist poor countries.
Another irony about AGOA is the first and second ratio-
nales may be practically inconsequential.  From a legal stand-
point, the rules of origin are complex.282  The cost of under-
standing and complying with them surely are high, all the more
so for an African producer/exporter with limited resources to
spend on competent trade counsel (if it even exists nearby).  As
suggested at the outset, the cost may approach the margin of
preference, cut into that margin, or even dwarf it.  To the extent
compliance costs create a disincentive to obtain AGOA benefits,
neither trade distortion nor dependency will follow.  This prob-
lem is known as “missing preferences,” as Oxfam International
explains:
The smaller and poorer a country is, the less able it is to es-
tablish a supporting textile industry that would enable it to
meet the conditions to get duty-free access to rich country
markets.  These countries are therefore penalized by “missing
preferences” to an even greater degree than the average de-
veloping country.283
Obviously, the problem of missing preferences is the heart of
this irony.  It means the ostensible purpose of AGOA—to pro-
vide a preference—is unfulfilled.
The problem of missing preferences is perhaps even more
likely to arise when an African producer-exporter seeks to ship
merchandise to multiple importing countries.  Suppose, for in-
stance, the producer-exporter aspires to gain a foothold not only
in the American market, but also in the EU market.  To gain
preferential access, it will be necessary to satisfy AGOA origin
282. As another example of intricacy in rules of origin, Oxfam International cites
the new U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement.  The rules in that accord run about 240
pages. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 22. R
283. OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 21.  Oxfam reports (as of 2001) high percent- R
ages of products that originate in certain least-developed countries and are eligible for
duty-free treatment by the EU under the “Everything But Arms” program initiative, but
which do not obtain this treatment:  94.6% of exports from Afghanistan; 73.8% of ex-
ports from the Maldives; 64% of exports from Cambodia; 49.9% of exports from Ban-
gladesh; and 41.1% of exports from Laos. See id. tbl.2.
\\server05\productn\F\FIN\29-2\FIN201.txt unknown Seq: 85 24-FEB-06 13:27
2006] THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GENEROSITY 383
rules for the American market, and EU origin rules for the Euro-
pean market.  To the extent the rules differ, the problem of un-
derstanding and applying them increases.  If the producer/ex-
porter seeks entry for its merchandise into still more markets,
and the importing countries have non-harmonized rules, then
the problem is yet worse.  Heterogeneous rules of origin are
dubbed the “spaghetti-bowl effect.”284  The point is to see the
interaction between this effect and missing preferences, as pro-
ducer-exporters simply—and rationally, from a cost-benefit per-
spective—elect not to seek preferential access.
C. Social Justice?
The first two reasons are grounded in development eco-
nomic theory.  There is a third reason, perhaps the most funda-
mental of all, for branding “devilish” on AGOA rules of origin
for apparel articles.  That reason is moral, indeed, religious:
these rules are entirely at variance with the preferential option
for the poor, which is a tenet of Catholic social justice theory
(and, in all likelihood, of justice criteria in other faiths).
This tenet is grounded in Gospel teaching and articulated
and elaborated in the Magisterium of the Church through (inter
alia) Papal encyclicals starting in 1891 with Rerum Novarum (On
the Condition of the Working Classes), by Pope Leo XIII, and
emphasized by Pope John Paul II in encyclicals such as Labourem
Exercens (On Human Work) (1981), Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (On
Social Concern) (1987), and Centesimus Annus (On the Hun-
dredth Anniversary of Rerum Novarum) (1991).285  In brief, it
demands primacy in public policy choices be given to the inter-
ests of the poor over the well-to-do.  America has moved from a
generic thirty-five percent value added test to a product-specific
set of rules of origin.  That is selfish.  Each U.S.-based company
can insert into what is or ought to be a charitable program its
own special device to make sure generosity stops where its self-
interest, however real or remote, begins.
In sharp contrast, Canada adopted in 2003 an “Initiative for
Least Developed Countries,” making it the only major developed
284. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Arvinid Panagariya, Bilateral Trade Treaties Are a Sham,
FIN. TIMES (London), July 14, 2003, at 17.
285. See Papal Encyclicals, http://www.papalencyclicals.net (last visited Nov. 17,
2005).
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country to fulfill its promise at the Doha Ministerial Conference
in November of 2001 to provide duty-free, quota-free treatment
on T&A articles from least developed countries.286  The Initiative
imposes a two-pronged test to qualify for such treatment, and
only one prong need be satisfied.  Either an article is made in a
least-developed country, regardless of value added at the final
stage of production (i.e., there is no value-added threshold for
the final stage), or at least twenty-five percent of the value added
to an article occurs in the final stage in a least-developed coun-
try, but inputs may come from any other country in the world,
and there is no dual substantial transformation requirement
concerning yarn-to-fabric and fabric-to clothing.287  Yet, under
AGOA, the keen export interest in T&A of Beneficiary SSACs is
subordinated to producers of T&A producing like merchandise
made in the United States.
True, the American T&A sector feels itself, for good reason,
under siege from cheaper imports.  Hundreds of thousands of
jobs have been lost in recent years, as the unsuccessful Vice Pres-
idential candidate, former Senator John Edwards, in the election
of 2004 noted repeatedly.288  From that perspective, to give GSP
treatment to such imports would wound further the decline of
the American T&A sector, or at least complicate its orderly con-
traction.  Accordingly, the GSP statutory product exemptions be-
speak a calculating generosity to poor countries.  That is mani-
fest in the fourth preference category, designed for the poorest
countries in SSA, with its early sunset rule and TRQ thresholds.
American willingness to give duty-free treatment extends only to
the line of a potential threat to domestic producers.
The socially just response, however, is not to cut back on
generosity toward the poorest countries.  Rather, it is to help the
shrinking American T&A sector though more generous trade ad-
justment assistance (“TAA”).289  Generosity is a positive sum
286. See OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 23.  The author understands from private R
conversations with trade officials in Auckland, New Zealand in spring 2003 that, as a
down payment in the Doha Round, New Zealand offers duty-free, quota free treatment
on textiles, clothing, and footwear from least-developed countries.
287. See id. at 19-20.
288. See Jim Rutenberg, The Ad Campaign; Edwards Vows to Protect Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 2004, at 20.
289. See, e.g., OXFAM INT’L, supra note 13, at 29 tbl.A1 (discussing TAA, and observ- R
ing (1) support for income, job search, re-employment services, relocation, and re-
training is critical, (2) only a small percentage of eligible workers benefit from TAA, (3)
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game, and TAA reform is an important play in that game.  How-
ever, this reform is for another article.
TAA tends to be poorly designed, underfunded, overly bureaucratic, and unresponsive
to the real needs of dislocated workers, and (4) recommending trade adjustment assis-
tance (“TAA”) be improved by cutting “red tape,” eliminating the 90 to 180 degree
review process during which workers get no assistance, increasing assistance levels, and
setting up local reception centers in affected areas); Lamar, supra note 19, at 611 (not- R
ing 300,000 jobs lost in the American apparel sector between 1991-1998, observing that
foreign competition is not the only culprit, and pointing out that technological ad-
vances have led to lower employment levels, but also higher productivity and increased
average hourly wages).
